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2 INTRODUCTION
Breakthrough or Breakpoint? 
Perspectives on the Nuclear Ban 
Treaty
Shatabhisha Shetty & Denitsa 
Raynova
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
(TPNW) is a landmark international agreement 
prohibiting a range of nuclear weapon-related 
activities, including acquiring, manufacturing, 
developing, testing, possessing and stockpiling 
nuclear weapons, threatening to use these 
weapons, or allowing any nuclear arms to be 
stationed on the territory of states party to 
the treaty. Its origins lie in the initiative on the 
humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, 
the UN General Assembly agreed by a majority in 
2016 to begin negotiations on a treaty banning 
nuclear weapons. The negotiations concluded 
in July 2017 with 122 states voting to adopt the 
YWJFY^ 4S  8JUYJRGJW  YMJ \TWQIѣX ܪWXY
legally binding treaty banning nuclear weapons 
opened for signature. By the end of November 
YMWJJHTZSYWNJXMFIWFYNܪJIFSIHTZSYWNJX
MFI XNLSJI YMJ YWJFY^ &KYJW  WFYNܪHFYNTSX YMNX
landmark treaty will enter into force.  
Proponents hail the treaty as historic, designed 
to stigmatise and delegitimise nuclear weapons 
possession and use. They maintain that it 
will establish a new norm akin to the ban on 
landmines, cluster munitions and chemical 
weapons. Frustrated and angry at the slow pace 
of disarmament by the nuclear weapon states, 
supporters believe that the treaty closes a “legal 
LFUѧKTWYMJUWTMNGNYNTSFSIJQNRNSFYNTSTK#?SZHQJFW
\JFUTSXFSIܪSFQQ^JXYFGQNXMJXFUFYM\F^KTWYMJ
elimination of nuclear weapons, complementing 
the efforts of existing disarmament frameworks 
such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT). 
>JYYMJYWJFY^FQXTKFHJXܪJWHJTUUTXNYNTS&QQSNSJ
nuclear-armed states - the U.S., Russia, the United 
Kingdom, China, France, India, Pakistan, North 
Korea, and Israel – boycotted the UN negotiations 
and the July 2017 vote. The United States, France, 
and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement 
immediately after the treaty was adopted, 
declaring they “do not intend to sign, ratify or 
ever become party to it”. No states dependent on 
nuclear extended deterrence guarantees such as 
NATO members or countries such as Australia, 
Japan and South Korea have endorsed the treaty. 
Opponents argue that the treaty neither addresses 
existing international security challenges, nor 
does it alter the conditions that make nuclear 
deterrence necessary. Rather, they contend that it 
will detract from other disarmament efforts and 
undermine the NPT, the cornerstone of the global 
non-proliferation and disarmament regime.
 
Entry into force of the treaty is likely as is 
continuous opposition from its detractors. As 
such, we are facing a deeply divided international 
community. To examine the ban treaty’s 
implications for the global nuclear order, the 
following collection of essays brings together 
contributions from international nuclear policy 
and arms control experts. They present current 
national and institutional attitudes towards the 
ban treaty and assess whether these are likely 
to change over time. The authors identify the 
challenges and opportunities for building bridges 
between proponents and opponents of the treaty 
in the months and years ahead.   
 
In the opening chapter, Daryl G. Kimball analyses 
the United States’ position towards the ban 
treaty and argues that the hostile rhetoric that 
Washington has used so far deepens the divide 
between the world’s nine nuclear-armed actors 
and the non-nuclear weapon majority of states. 
The U.S. sees the ban treaty as competing with 
existing disarmament initiatives and failing to 
offer a credible alternative to deterrence. By 
SHATABHISHA SHETTY & DENITSA RAYNOVA 3
revisiting the language and logic of the ban 
RT[JRJSY 0NRGFQQ NIJSYNܪJX YMJ XMTWYHTRNSLX
of this rationale. He underscores the need for 
quiet diplomacy among the nuclear-armed states, 
and offers six pragmatic steps for bridging the 
rift between supporters and sceptics. Most 
importantly, he highlights the need for the United 
States and others to consider the legitimate 
concerns of non-nuclear weapon states and 
demonstrate willingness to engage with them.
In the next chapter, Dr Nikolai Sokov sets out 
the Russian perspective on the ban treaty. He 
highlights the similarities between Russian 
and American objections to the treaty, noting 
that the two states share a common belief that 
disarmament can only be achieved through the 
gradual reduction of nuclear arms. Dr Sokov 
stresses that Russia considers the ban treaty to 
be an unrealistic path to disarmament. He adds 
that the widespread and popular consensus 
inside Russia over the need to preserve nuclear 
weapons suggests that current Russian policy will 
not change in the foreseeable future.
Setting out the position of European nuclear 
weapon states, Paul Schulte offers his 
assessment of the United Kingdom and France. 
He highlights the similarities between the two 
countries in their understanding and rejection 
of the ban treaty. While both governments have 
repeatedly raised objections to the treaty, they 
MF[J FQXT WJFKܪWRJI YMJNW IJXNWJ KTW WJIZHNSL
global nuclear stockpiles. In this context, 
Professor Schulte argues that the UK and 
France should conduct discreet soundings with 
moderate states and organisations supporting 
the ban treaty in advance of the 2018 UN High 
Level Conference on Nuclear Disarmament and 
the 2020 NPT Review Conference. 
9T HTRUQJYJ YMJ [NJ\ KWTR FQQ YMJ 5 3ZHQJFW
Weapon States, the next chapter deals with 
China. Raymond Wang & Tong Zhao argue that, 
as a nuclear weapon state and an emerging 
global power, China can and should take steps 
to respond constructively to the ban treaty and 
help mitigate the growing international divide. 
Zhao and Wang see the months ahead as an 
opportunity to align China’s policy with some of 
the core principles within the treaty. They present 
the case for China to remain as a non-State Party 
but still engage substantively with supporters of 
the ban movement. In their assessment, engaging 
proactively with non-nuclear weapons states is 
the necessary step to preserve the international 
consensus on disarmament. They see it as a 
way of strengthening nuclear security and as an 
avenue though which China can strengthen its 
global leadership.
In the following chapter, Dr Hirofumi Tosaki 
presents the perspective of a “nuclear umbrella” 
state, focusing on Japan. Dr Tosaki argues that 
in Japan’s view, the ban would neither solve, nor 
contribute to resolving current security challenges 
NSYMJ&XNF5FHNܪHWJLNTS/FUFS[NJ\XYMJYWJFY^
as destabilising by negatively affecting its national 
security. He points out that an effective prohibition 
of nuclear weapons would require a fundamental 
change of perception on the role of such weapons 
and the conditions for such a change have 
worsened. Dr Tosaki also notes Japan’s interest 
in revitalising the Non-Proliferation Treaty review 
process and readiness to support the Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) 
as a way of closing the gap between the two 
opposing camps.
In considering the implications of the ban treaty 
for NATO member states, Emil Dall describes the 
INKܪHZQY GFQFSHNSL FHY KFHJI G^ XTRJ &QQNJX FSI
NATO partners. He argues that the treaty cannot 
be ignored by the Alliance for two reasons. The 
ܪWXYNXITRJXYNHXZUUTWYKTWSZHQJFWINXFWRFRJSY
by a number of NATO countries that make 
initiatives such as the ban treaty attractive. 
Norway and the Netherlands, for instance, have 
prominent disarmament constituencies and have 
previously led on other disarmament initiatives. 
The second, and perhaps more urgent reason, 
is the Alliance’s partnerships with non-NATO 
states that are strong supporters of the treaty, yet 
maintain close defence and security cooperation 
with NATO. To avoid divisions between key 
stakeholders in the Alliance and partners in its 
immediate neighbourhood, Dall recommends 
constructive dialogue on mutual defence short 
of nuclear weapons, a commitment to close 
non-NATO member partners who may consider 
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signing the treaty, and continuation of work on 
joint disarmament initiatives.
In Chapter 7 of the collection, Dr Nick Ritchie 
presents the ban treaty proponents’ view, 
arguing that the treaty attempts to delegitimise 
and diminish nuclear weapons as a currency 
of power in global politics. He contends that 
disarmament diplomacy has shifted from trying 
to change the policies of the countries that 
possess nuclear weapons to changing the global 
legal normative environment in which they are 
embedded, by challenging the acceptability of 
nuclear weapons. Dr Ritchie argues that the 
treaty does not undermine other disarmament 
initiatives that impose physical constraints (on 
XYTHPUNQJX YJXYNSL ܪXXNQJ RFYJWNFQ UWTIZHYNTS
deployments). Instead, it complements them by 
XJYYNSLFUWTMNGNYN[JFLJSIFIJXNLSJIYTNSܫZJSHJ
declaratory policy, use, and possession. Thus, 
the purpose of the ban treaty is to challenge 
the acceptability of nuclear violence, to create a 
‘crisis of legitimacy’ of current defence postures, 
precipitating a transformation of nuclear policies 
and practices.
Dr Matthew Harries assesses the implications for 
US extended nuclear deterrence arrangements 
of a future disarmament and non-proliferation 
architecture which will include the ban treaty. In 
his analysis, Dr Harries sees the uncompromising 
advocacy of the pro-ban movement as 
destabilising to the moderate stance of countries 
reliant on the United States’ nuclear umbrella. 
Although there are different perspectives, ranging 
from supportive views of disarmament to clear 
opposition, the ban discourse may paradoxically 
consolidate support for nuclear deterrence. Yet, 
ban treaty supporters should not be dismissed 
NS HTZSYWNJX YMFY GJSJܪY KWTR YMJ :8 XJHZWNY^
guarantee. Dr Harries argues that umbrella states 
are well-positioned to engage more deeply in 
exploring the conditions for serious nuclear 
disarmament. For example, they could support 
research on exploring strategic stability at low 
numbers of nuclear weapons and thus work 
towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.
.S YMJ ܪSFQ HMFUYJW Andrea Berger TZYQNSJX ܪ[J
recommendations for strengthening the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the consensus-
based tool for working towards a nuclear 
weapons-free world. She makes the case that 
supporters and opponents of the ban should 
ܪSI F RZYZFQQ^ FLWJJFGQJ \F^ YT FI[FSHJ 359
focused initiatives, arguing that both sides should 
accept a political reality in which the ban exists, 
despite the fact that it creates stark divisions 
in the international system. She proposes that 
opponents should adopt a more moderate 
tone and posture. Berger further emphasises 
YMJ NRUTWYFSHJ TK YMJ 5 5WTHJXX FSI YMJ 3TS
Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) as 
additional credible drivers of disarmament, as well 
as the need for creative initiatives related to arms 
control and disarmament such as the International 
5FWYSJWXMNUKTW3ZHQJFW)NXFWRFRJSY;JWNܪHFYNTS
(IPNDV), which engage both ban supporters and 
critics. Crucially, she suggests that the 2020 NPT 
Review Conference should be used to mitigate 
some of the potential longer-term effects of a 
ban, addressing and calming down the current 
tensions.
By offering a range of expert analyses on the 
different perspectives about the ban treaty, our 
aim is to encourage a better understanding of the 
underlying motives and objectives of the treaty, 
the humanitarian impacts movement and the 
rationale of those who are cautious or hostile. 
By exposing the most contentious aspects of the 
debate this approach offers a means of identifying 
opportunities and initiatives to reconcile the 
different approaches to nuclear disarmament 
and unite the international community around a 
practical, future-oriented programme of action 
that could lead to the reduction and ultimately the 
elimination of nuclear arsenals. 
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6 THE UNITED STATES AND THE NUCLEAR BAN TREATY
“...the treaty can, 
over time, help to 
further delegitimize 
nuclear weapons and 
strengthen the legal and 
political norm against 
their use.”
Daryl G. Kimball
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Daryl G. Kimball 
In her remarks before an emergency UN Security 
(TZSHNQ GWNJܪSL TS  8JUYJRGJW  KTQQT\NSL
North Korea’s sixth and largest nuclear test 
explosion, U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley lectured 
Pyongyang’s leaders that “… being a nuclear 
power is not about using those terrible weapons 
to threaten others. Nuclear powers understand 
their responsibilities.” 
Indeed, all states parties to the 1968 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear-armed and non-
nuclear alike have obligations and responsibilities 
under the NPT and other key nuclear arms control, 
non-proliferation, and disarmament arrangements. 
This includes the obligation, set forth in Article VI 
of the NPT for the nuclear-armed states and other 
NPT parties, to “pursue negotiations in good faith 
on effective measures relating to cessation of the 
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament….” 1
Despite North Korea’ increasingly dangerous drive 
to develop and test a more advanced missiles 
FSI \FWMJFIX NS IJܪFSHJ TK YMJ 359 YMJ STS
proliferation regime though imperfect, has been a 
success. The NPT and the broader nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament enterprise, which 
includes the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT), have slowed the spread of 
nuclear weapons and technology, prompted the 
two largest nuclear powers, the United States 
and Russia, to slash their arsenals, brought about 
a halt to all nuclear testing by all but one state, 
and created an informal taboo against nuclear 
weapons use. 
э United Nations, THE TREATY ON THE NON-
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT), 1970, 
Available here: MYYU\\\ZSTWLJSHTSKSUY
npttreaty.html 
But today, progress on nuclear disarmament 
is stalled, key NPT-related disarmament 
responsibilities and obligations are going unmet 
and tensions are growing between major nuclear-
actors.  
The push to negotiate and sign the new Treaty 
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) 
is a powerful and constructive response from 
the world’s non-nuclear weapon state majority 
to the growing risks posed by nuclear weapons 
and the growing frustration with the failure of the 
SZHQJFWFWRJI XYFYJX YT KZQܪQ YMJNW 359SZHQJFW
disarmament responsibilities and commitments. 
9MJNSNYNFYN[J\MNHMMFXNS[TQ[JIRTWJYMFS
states and a worldwide civil society movement led 
by the Nobel Peace Prize-winning the International 
Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, is a good 
faith effort to act on their responsibilities as NPT 
member states to pursue effective measures 
on disarmament and help end the arms race. 
The TPNW further reinforces the commitments 
of these states against the use, threat of 
use, development, production, manufacture, 
acquisition, possession, stockpiling, transfer, 
stationing, or installation of nuclear weapons.
While the new TPNW will not, by itself, immediately 
eliminate any nuclear weapons, the treaty can, 
over time, help to further delegitimize nuclear 
weapons and strengthen the legal and political 
norm against their use. Steps aimed at reducing 
the risk of catastrophic nuclear weapons use are 
necessary and should be welcomed.
Unfortunately, the United States and the world’s 
other major nuclear weapons actors have 
responded by boycotting the negotiations and 
strongly criticizing the effort as “a distraction” that 
undermines more effective nuclear disarmament 
and non-proliferation measures.
In comments to Arms Control Today following 
the conclusion of UN negotiations on the TPNW 
in July, Chris Ford, special assistant to the 
The United States and the Nuclear 
Ban Treaty 
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President and senior director for weapons of 
mass destruction and counter-proliferation on 
the U.S. National Security Council said the TPNW 
is “ineffective at best and may in fact be deeply 
counterproductive.”
Ford said the United States government hopes 
“…that the more thoughtful of its supporters will 
join us in seeking genuinely effective measures 
WJQFYJIYTJSINSLSZHQJFWFWRXWFHJXFSIKZQܪQQNSL
the objectives of the NPT.”
However, not only is the critique levelled against 
YMJ 953< G^ :8 TKܪHNFQX ܫF\JI GZY YMJNW
promises of support for effective measures to 
end the arms race ring hollow in the absence 
of any clearly articulated strategy or initiative 
designed to do so. Worse yet, President Trump’s 
own statements about “expanding” the scale 
and scope of the already excessively large U.S. 
nuclear arsenal severely undermine the credibility 
TKUWTRNXJXKWTRXJSNTW:8TKܪHNFQXFGTZY:8
support for nuclear restraint and disarmament. 
8NSHJFWWN[NSLNSTKܪHJYMJSJ\FIRNSNXYWFYNTSMFX
pledged to increase U.S. spending to replace and 
upgrade U.S. strategic nuclear weapons delivery 
systems that would sustain force levels that are 
one-third larger (approximately 1,800 deployed 
\FWMJFIXYMFSYMJ5JSYFLTSIJYJWRNSJINS
are necessary for deterrence requirements.2 
President Trump reportedly sharply criticized 
the 2010 New START agreement with Russia, 
and the administration has not yet responded 
YT 7ZXXNFS UWTUTXFQX YT J]YJSI NY FSTYMJW ܪ[J
years beyond its scheduled 2021 expiration date. 
Prospects for future arms control arrangements 
are dim so long as the lingering dispute between 
Washington and Moscow over Russia’s reported 
testing and deployment of ground-based cruise 
missiles in violation of the 1987 Intermediate-
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty continues. Later this 
э Department of Defence, Report on Nuclear 
*RUQT^RJSY8YWFYJL^TKYMJ:SNYJI8YFYJX8UJHNܪJINS
8JHYNTSTK:8(&[FNQFGQJMJWJhttps://
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/us-
nuclear-employment-strategy.pdf
year the Pentagon will complete a review of U.S. 
nuclear weapons policy. A report in POLITICO 
on 9 September 2017 suggested that one 
recommendation will be to develop new types of 
“more usable” nuclear weapons to deter, and if 
necessary, wage war against Russia.
Instead of further deepening the growing divide 
between the world’s nine nuclear-armed actors 
and the non-nuclear weapon state majority by 
aggressively criticizing the nuclear ban treaty, 
:8 TKܪHNFQX XMTZQI HTSXNIJW ZXNSL RTWJ
conciliatory language and tactics that help build 
bridges. Even more importantly, the new Trump 
administration must itself focus on advancing 
concrete measures that would reduce the 
role and number of nuclear weapons and help 
them meet their own NPT-related disarmament 
responsibilities. 
&ܫF\JI:8HWNYNVZJYMFYRNXXJXYMJ
UTNSY
8T KFW 9WZRU FIRNSNXYWFYNTS TKܪHNFQX MF[J
maintained an aggressively critical stance 
toward the TPNW and its state supporters. 
This will likely foster further resentment by key 
partners in the global nuclear non-proliferation 
and disarmament enterprise. The NSC’s Ford 
told a Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace Roundtable on 22 August 2017 that the 
new nuclear ban treaty will “make the world a 
more dangerous and unstable place by seeking 
to delegitimize the ‘extended deterrence’ alliance 
relationships that the United States has with its 
allies.” 
э POLITICO, Trump review leans toward 
proposing mini-nuke, 2017, Available here: 
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/09/
YWZRUWJ[NJ\XRNSNSZPJ
э Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
'WNJܪSLTS3ZHQJFW'FS9WJFY^G^38(8JSNTW
Director Christopher Ford, 2017, Available here:http://
HFWSJLNJJSIT\RJSYTWLGWNJܪSLTS
nuclear-ban-treaty-by-nsc-senior-director-christopher-
KTWIJ[JSY
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9MFY FWLZRJSY MT\J[JW STY TSQ^ HTSܫFYJX
nuclear deterrence with conventional deterrence, 
but erroneously suggests that participation by 
certain NATO countries in nuclear war planning 
and others in the stationing of U.S. nuclear 
weapons (prohibited by the TPNW) is necessary 
to prevent them from pursuing their own nuclear 
arsenals. In reality, by perpetuating outdated 
deployments of tactical nuclear weapons in 
Europe, U.S. and NATO leaders provide no 
meaningful additional military capability for the 
FQQNFSHJFSIYMJ^HWJFYJFOZXYNܪHFYNTSKTW7ZXXNF
to maintain its own residual stockpile of short-
range nuclear attack systems—all of which makes 
the continued deployment of these weapons in the 
name of “extended deterrence” an impediment to 
disarmament. 
Although the main thrust of the TPNW was, by 
design, to negotiate a treaty to prohibit nuclear 
weapons possession, development, and use, 
rather than a comprehensive convention for the 
complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, U.S. 
TKܪHNFQX XZHM FX +TWI MF[J HWNYNHN_JI YMJ 953<
for not constructing a detailed framework for 
nuclear weapons elimination. 
:8 TKܪHNFQX FQXT HWNYNHN_J YMJ 953< KTW NYX
anodyne safeguards provisions. Ideally, the 
UWT[NXNTSX NS &WYNHQJ  KTW XFKJLZFWIX FLFNSXY
nuclear weapons programs would have included a 
XUJHNܪHWJVZNWJRJSYKTWRTWJWNLTWTZXNSXUJHYNTS
procedures under the terms of the Additional 
Protocol or even stronger measures. But it should 
be no surprise to any experienced diplomat that, 
in a negotiation involving almost exclusively non-
nuclear weapon states, most would resist taking 
on new legally-binding safeguards obligations 
if doing so did not help them secure stronger 
commitments from nuclear weapon states for 
disarmament. Such matters have been and will 
continue to be debated within the context of the 
NPT review process.
Another common U.S. complaint about the TPNW, 
repeated by Ford, is that it will “harm the effective 
operation of the global non-proliferation regime 
by increasingly entangling and preoccupying 
states …in contentious debates and disputes over 
disarmament policy, making it harder for them 
to do the job the international community needs 
them to do in preventing nuclear proliferation.” 
But such a conversation does not harm or distract 
from the work of the NPT or the Conference on 
Disarmament because serious discussion on 
disarmament, as well as non-proliferation, is the 
business of those entities. 
:8 TKܪHNFQX NSHQZINSL +TWI FQXT \TWW^ YMFY YMJ
TPNW will create “a competitor” regime to the NPT 
ѰFSI UJWMFUX JSYNHJ IJKJHYNTSX KWTR YMJ#? 359
There certainly is no substitute for the NPT and 
defections would be disastrous. But the evidence 
does not support such fears coming to pass. A 
review of the record of the TPNW talks, and a look 
at the treaty itself, show clearly that the states 
that negotiated and will sign the prohibition treaty 
remain strongly supportive of the NPT even if they 
are disappointed with record of implementation 
on disarmament and non-proliferation by certain 
states. If anything, the process leading up the 
conclusion of the prohibition treaty has deepened 
their commitment to non-proliferation and 
disarmament and the pursuit of a world free of 
nuclear weapons.
&UWTLWFRKTWFHYNTS
Negotiations on a ban on nuclear weapons 
development, possession, and use are not a 
substitute for necessary, progressive steps on 
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. 
With the TPNW now a reality, its supporters, 
sceptics, and opponents must put aside their 
disagreements about the new agreement and 
ܪSISJ\FSIHWJFYN[J\F^X YTHTRJ YTLJYMJW YT
strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation regime.
Rather than foster resentment by actively lobbying 
states not to sign the treaty, Trump administration 
TKܪHNFQX FSI YMJNW XZHHJXXTWX XMTZQI YFPJ YMJ
high road. They could simply say that, “at this 
time, given the global security environment, we 
cannot join the prohibition treaty, but we respect 
the intentions of those who have pursued it.”  
Most importantly, Washington must also put its 
nuclear weapons policy house in order. To do 
so, the understaffed and overstretched Trump 
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administration should get behind a modest but 
important program of action designed to maintain 
and reinforce existing nuclear arms control and 
non-proliferation measures, while pursuing new 
options to ease the growing tensions between 
nuclear-armed states and open the way to more 
substantial disarmament steps down the road. 
To move forward, the United States will need a 
little help and quiet diplomatic pressure from 
its friends: the other NPT nuclear-armed states 
and the U.S. allies who stood aside from the 
prohibition treaty negotiations.  
Failure to do so may not only undermine long-
YJWRXZUUTWYFSIHTSܪIJSHJNSYMJ:SNYJI8YFYJX
leadership role, but the NPT itself.  At a minimum, 
this program for action might include the following 
elements:
“To move forward, the 
United States will need 
a little help and quiet 
diplomatic pressure from 
its friends...”
Implement the Iran deal. To start, the Trump 
administration should commit to implement rather 
YMFSZSIJWRNSJYMJFLWJJRJSYGJY\JJS.WFS
FSI XN] \TWQI UT\JWX YMFY [JWNܪFGQ^ QNRNYX .WFSѣX
weapons-relevant nuclear activities. The Iran deal 
is working and cannot be “renegotiated.” If Trump 
or the U.S. Congress take actions that unravel 
the agreement, it would create the conditions for 
a spiral of proliferation in the region and would 
undermine the NPT.
Pursue Diplomacy with North Korea. The Trump 
team must also refrain from bombastic threats 
against North Korea in response to its nuclear 
and missile tests and work with allies to better 
implement existing UN sanctions against 
Pyongyang, and actively pursue talks with North 
Korea to ease tensions, avoid miscommunication 
in a crisis. The U.S., in coordination with China 
and South Korea, should follow-up by proposing a 
framework for sustained negotiations designed to 
halt and reverse that country’s dangerous nuclear 
pursuits and to establish a peace regime on the 
peninsula.
Sober language on nuclear dangers. President 
Trump has quickly developed a reputation as 
an impulsive, ill-informed commander-in-chief, 
\MT YTT JFXNQ^ YMWJFYJSX SZHQJFW ѦܪWJ FSI KZW^ѧ
against potential adversaries. Russia has also 
engaged in reckless nuclear sabre-rattling. When 
Presidents Trump and Putin meet next, the two 
leaders could reduce worries about nuclear 
RNXXYJUX G^ WJFKܪWRNSL YMJ  XYFYJRJSY G^
U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev that “a nuclear war cannot be 
won and must never be fought.” 
Extend New START and seek deeper cuts. As 
5WJXNIJSY'FWFHP4GFRFSTYJINSMNXܪSFQUWJXX
conference, “[T]here remains a lot of room for 
both countries to reduce our nuclear stockpiles.” 
<NYM ZU YT  IJUQT^JI XYWFYJLNH SZHQJFW
weapons allowed under New START, Russia and 
the United States can safely cut their bloated 
nuclear stockpiles further without negotiating a 
new treaty. 
By agreeing to extend New START and its 
[JWNܪHFYNTS UWT[NXNTSX G^ ܪ[J ^JFWX YT 
9WZRUFSI5ZYNSHTZQIHTSܪIJSYQ^UZWXZJKZWYMJW
XNLSNܪHFSY UFWFQQJQ WJIZHYNTSX TK \FWMJFI FSI
delivery system inventories by one-third or more 
and still meet their respective nuclear deterrence 
requirements. This step would ease tensions and 
reduce fears of a new nuclear arms race, plus it 
would reduce the skyrocketing price of nuclear 
weapons. Without a decision to extend New 
START before its scheduled expiration date of 
February 2021, there would be no limits on the 
\TWQIѣX Y\T QFWLJXYSZHQJFWFWXJSFQX KTW YMJܪWXY
time since the early-1970s, and the credibility 
of the U.S. and Russian commitment to pursue 
effective measures on nuclear arms control and 
disarmament would be in tatters.
Address INF Treaty violations. Russia’s 
deployment of ground-based cruise missiles 
prohibited by the landmark INF Treaty is a serious 
matter. However, Russia’s missile deployments 
ITSTY^JYXNLSNܪHFSYQ^FQYJW YMJRNQNYFW^GFQFSHJ
and the Trump administration should reject 
Congressional pressure to respond in-kind by 
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pursuing a new nuclear weapon system. Instead, 
the two sides should agree to discuss compliance 
concerns at another meeting of the treaty’s 
8UJHNFQ ;JWNܪHFYNTS (TRRNXXNTS FSI YT \TWP YT
WJXTQ[JFQQTZYXYFSINSLHTRUQNFSHJNXXZJX#?
If Moscow continues to deploy the banned ground-
launched cruise missiles, U.S. and NATO leaders 
should insist that the weapons would need to be 
counted under the limits set in the next round 
of nuclear arms reductions. Washington should 
also continue to support ongoing NATO efforts 
to bolster the conventional defences of those 
allies that would be potential targets of Russian 
aggression or intimidation.
7JFKܪWRYMJ(TRRNYRJSYYTYMJ(9'9. For more 
than two decades, the United States has led global 
JKKTWYXYT[JWNܪFGQ^MFQYSZHQJFWYJXYNSLџFSFHYN[NY^
that is not necessary for maintaining the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal but that can be used to advance 
other states’ nuclear weapons capabilities and 
YMFYKZJQXSZHQJFWUWTQNKJWFYNTS#?&X#?:88JHWJYFW^
of State Rex Tillerson wrote in his responses to 
VZJXYNTSX KWTR MNX /FSZFW^  HTSܪWRFYNTS
hearing, “I think the [nuclear test] moratorium has 
served us well.”
The United States and China have signed but not 
^JY WFYNܪJI YMJ  (TRUWJMJSXN[J 9JXY 'FS
Treaty (CTBT). Six other CTBT “hold-out” states 
must also ratify to trigger its formal entry into 
force, but U.S. leadership is essential. Explicit and 
clear support from Washington for the CTBT is 
even more important in the wake of North Korea’s 
6th and by far its largest nuclear test explosion on 
8JUYJRGJW
The Trump administration should be pressed to 
WJFKܪWRNYXTGQNLFYNTSSTYYTHTSIZHYSZHQJFWYJXY
explosions and to review whether and when to 
UZWXZJTK8JSFYJFUUWT[FQKTW:8WFYNܪHFYNTS.S
the meantime, states that have conducted nuclear 
test explosions in the past, including the United 
States and China, as well as other leading CTBT 
states parties and TPNW signatories, should 
WJFKܪWRYMJNWXZUUTWYKTWFUJWRFSJSY[JWNܪFGQJ
end to nuclear test explosions through a joint 
heads of state declaration on the occasion of the 
th anniversary of the negotiation of the NPT in 
2018. 
2T[NSLKTW\FWI
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
is here. Contrary to hype, it is not a “distraction,” nor 
will it undermine the NPT– so long as ban treaty 
advocates recognize its value and its limitations 
and so long as the nuclear weapon states do 
not continue to suggest that the ban treaty is the 
source of the nuclear non-proliferation regime’s 
problems.
In reality, the stresses and strains on the NPT are 
due to the actions of North Korea, the inability of 
the major nuclear armed states to make progress 
on disarmament commitments, the technological 
arms race by the nuclear weapon states, and the 
failure of key states in the Middle East to agree 
on the agenda for a conference on a weapons of 
mass destruction-free zone in their region.
To strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation 
and disarmament enterprise, prohibition treaty 
supporters, sceptics, and opponents must 
put aside their disagreements about the new 
FLWJJRJSY FSI ܪSI SJ\ FSI HWJFYN[J \F^X
to come together to strengthen the nuclear 
disarmament and non-proliferation regime. 
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“Russia’s reaction to the 
signing of the ban treaty 
has been unequivocally 
negative... Nuclear 
weapons are 
considered critical to 
Russia’s security and 
NSܫZJSHJѧ
Nikolai Sokov
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Russia’s reaction to the signing of the Treaty on the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has been 
unequivocally negative. It matches the reaction of 
other four nuclear weapon states (NWS) who claim 
that implementation of Article VI of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is proceeding at a 
reasonable pace and in good faith. They all argue 
that “fast-tracked” nuclear disarmament could 
undermine international security rather than 
strengthen it. Yet the Russian attitude is different 
to that of the other NWS in a number of ways. 
Examining these differences provides important 
insights into Moscow’s perspective on nuclear 
disarmament, international security, and other 
aspects of its foreign policy.
7TQJ TK SZHQJFW \JFUTSX NS 7ZXXNFS
XJHZWNY^UTQNH^
Nuclear weapons are considered critical to 
7ZXXNFѣXXJHZWNY^FSINSܫZJSHJ2TXHT\GJQNJ[JX
that it simply cannot afford to lose them in 
the existing and the foreseeable international 
environment. This attitude was clearly expressed 
NS 7ZXXNFѣX ܪWXY IJYFNQJI FSI HTRUWJMJSXN[J
statement on the TPNW presented by Mikhail 
Ulyanov, the director of the Nonproliferation and 
Arms Control Department of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry. Ulyanov emphasized that “nuclear 
weapons are, objectively, one of the elements 
that hold together international security… If, 
all of a sudden, that element is removed, the 
entire structure of international security could 
be, at a minimum, shaken with unpredictable 
consequences.”1 Several weeks later Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared at the 
Moscow Nonproliferation Conference that the 
э “Zapret Yadernogo Oruzhiya Protivorechit 
Natsionalnym Interesam Rossii” (A Ban on Nuclear 
Weapons Contradicts National Interests of Russia). 
Kommesant-Daily, September 12, 2017 (Available here 
: MYYUX\\\PTRRJWXFSYWZITH$Y\) 
nuclear ban treaty “ignores the need in accounting 
for all factors that affect strategic stability… As a 
result, the world may become even less stable and 
predictable.” He explained that the proponents of 
the TPNW chose to ignore the “new deadly and 
JKܪHNJSY Y^UJX TK \JFUTSX YMFY MF[J FUUJFWJI
since the signing of the NPT.”2
The Russian attitude toward prohibition treaty 
is grounded in the belief that the entire system 
of international law and varying international 
XJHZWNY^WJLNRJXMFX\JFPJSJIT[JWYMJQFXY
20 years. The major turning point was in 1999 
when NATO used force against Serbia without the 
authorization of the UN Security Council (UNSC). 
Moscow saw that as signalling that its privileged 
position and its right of veto in the UNSC had only 
limited value. As such military balance acquired 
greater importance and military power was 
considered the only sound foundation for security 
FSI NSܫZJSHJ 9MJ WFYNTSFQJ \FX YT GFQFSHJ
Moscow’s two vastly more powerful neighbours: 
the United States and NATO in the west and, 
YMTZLM SJ[JW RJSYNTSJI TKܪHNFQQ^ FSI WFWJQ^
ZSTKܪHNFQQ^ (MNSF NS YMJ JFXY .S YMNX XNYZFYNTS
nuclear weapons are the ultimate, if not the only, 
security guarantee.
Following the 1999 Kosovo war, Russia adopted 
a “de-escalation” or “escalate to de-escalate” 
FUUWTFHMYTSZHQJFW\JFUTSXNJQNRNYJIܪWXYZXJ
in response to a large-scale conventional attack. 
9MFY XYWFYJL^ F RTINܪJI [JWXNTS TK 3&94ѣX
э Vystuplenie i Otvety na Voprosy Ministra 
Inostrannykh Del Rossiiskooi Federatsii S.V Lavrova 
na Moskovskoi Konferentsii po Nerasprostraneniyu, 
20 oktabrya 2017 goda (Statement and Answers 
to Questions by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Russian Federation S.V Lavrov at the Moscow 
Nonproliferation Conference, October 20, 2017) The 
2NSNXYW^TK+TWJNLS&KKFNWXITHZRJSY, 
Available here: http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/
international_safety/disarmament/-/asset_publisher/
WUܪ:'R&3F-HTSYJSYNI. 
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ѦܫJ]NGQJ WJXUTSXJѧ XYWFYJL^ KWTR YMJ X NX
intended to deter war under conditions where 
there is an asymmetry in conventional forces. 
However Russia’s does envision reducing its 
WJQNFSHJ TS SZHQJFW \JFUTSX .S  YMJ YMJS
Minister of Defense, Sergey Ivanov, proclaimed 
that Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons would 
only continue until it succeeded in developing 
modern conventional capabilities. That statement 
signalled that Moscow planned to go the way of 
the United States which, after the end of the Cold 
War, dramatically reduced its reliance on nuclear 
weapons and its nuclear arsenal by transferring 
many military and political missions (which 
were previously assigned to nuclear weapons) 
YT RTIJWS HTS[JSYNTSFQ KTWHJX .S  7ZXXNF
demonstrated improvements in its conventional 
HFUFGNQNY^ G^ ܪWNSL QTSLWFSLJ XJFQFZSHMJI
cruise missiles into Syria. Full capability is still 
years away and perhaps only achievable by the 
middle of the next decade. Yet the Chief of the 
General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valeri 
Gerasimov, already announced that progress in 
developing long-range conventional weapons 
and the prospect of acquiring hypersonic delivery 
vehicles will enable Russia to reduce its reliance 
on nuclear weapons in the future. Although 
reduced reliance on nuclear weapons will be a 
positive development, this transition will take time 
and nuclear weapons will still play an important 
role in Russia’s national security policy. 
9MJUFYMYT\FWIINXFWRFRJSY
 
Russia insists that the rightful path toward the 
э Vystuplenie Nachalnika Generalnogo Shtaba 
Vooruzhenykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii – Pervogo 
Zamestitelya Ministra Oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
Generala Armii Valeriya Gerasimova na Otkrytom 
Zasedanii Kollegii Minoborony Rossii, 7 noyabrya 
2017 g. (Statement by Chief of General Staff of the 
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation – First 
Deputy Minister of Defense Army General Valeri 
Gerasimov at the Open Meeting of the Collegium of 
the Ministry of Defense, November 7, 2017), Available 
here:  http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.
MYR$NI"%JL3J\X 
world free of nuclear weapons is through gradual 
reductions that will eventually reach zero. This 
is aligned with the United States’ position. A 
familiar sight at all NPT Review Conferences 
and Preparatory Committees are American and 
Russian representatives extolling the virtues of 
the 2010 New START Treaty as well as additional 
unilateral reductions. Nevertheless, these 
achievements look unimpressive in light of the 
virtual stalemate in bilateral arms control efforts 
since 2010 which are likely to continue.  However, 
the similarity of American and Russian statements 
hides fundamental differences in approach. The 
United States seeks to limit future arms control 
agreements to nuclear weapons while Russia 
insists on what it often calls an “integrated 
approach” which encompasses nuclear weapons, 
modern long-range conventional weapons, missile 
defence, and “space weapons” (the latter category 
MFX WJRFNSJI ZSIJWIJܪSJI \NYMNS F XNSLQJ
package. This approach was formulated relatively 
recently in the testimony of Foreign Minister 
8JWLJ^1F[WT[IZWNSLYMJ3J\89&79WFYNܪHFYNTS
hearings in 2011 in the Russian Parliament, 
although elements have been part of the Russian 
position for many years. Additionally, the Russian 
UTXNYNTSST\NSHQZIJXFWJVZNWJRJSYYMFYTYMJW5
states join the United States and Russia for the 
next arms control treaty. In contrast, the United 
States tends to postpone the multilateralization 
TKFWRXHTSYWTQZSYNQFSZSIJܪSJIRTRJSYNSYMJ
future. 
Until these differences are reconciled, nuclear 
reductions and further arms control will remain 
XYFQQJI .Y NXINKܪHZQY YTXJJ\MFYHTZQI NSܫZJSHJ
э “Stenogramma Vystupleniya Ministra Inostrannykh 
Del Rossii S.V. Lavrova na Plenarnom Zasedanii 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federalnogo Sobraniya 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii npo Novomy Dogovoru o 
83;2TXP[F>FS[FW^FLTIF@9WFSXHWNUY
of a Statement by Foreign Minister of the Russian 
Federation Sergey Lavrov at a Plenary Meeting of the 
State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian 
+JIJWFYNTSTSYMJ3J\89&799WJFY^/FSZFW^
Bѧ7ZXXNFS2NSNXYW^TK+TWJNLS&KKFNWX/FSZFW^
2011, Available here:  http://www.mfa.ru. 
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the United States to broaden its approach 
TW NSܫZJSHJ 7ZXXNF YT SFWWT\ NYX FUUWTFHM
Russia and the United States both share two 
important attitudes: they both reject early nuclear 
disarmament and both would rather continue 
stalling further bilateral arms control efforts than 
agree to a compromise with the other. This does 
not bode well for a change of Russian approach 
to the TPMW.
4UNSNTSXTZYXNIJYMJLT[JWSRJSY
Another important feature of the Russian attitude 
towards the TPNW which sets it apart from 
the western NWS is the near consensus within 
Russia. There is no public support within Russia 
for the ban treaty. There isn’t a single reputable 
nongovernmental organization or a think tank 
that has espoused even minimal support for 
it. Governmental control has little if anything 
to do with that unanimity. The vast majority of 
nongovernmental experts genuinely adhere to 
similar views of those of the government and 
appear to sincerely regard nuclear weapons as 
HJSYWFQYT7ZXXNFѣXXJHZWNY^FSINSܫZJSHJ
“Russian public opinion 
can be summarized as 
‘nuclear weapons are a 
necessary evil’ or ‘retain 
but not use.’” 
Russian public opinion can be summarized as 
“nuclear weapons are a necessary evil” or “retain 
but not use.” According to recent surveys by two 
WJUZYFGQJ 7ZXXNFS UZGQNH TUNSNTS ܪWRX +42
and VTSIOM, half or more of the Russian public 
believes that war with the United States and 
3&94 NX QNPJQ^ 9MNX FQNLSX HQTXJQ^ \NYM TKܪHNFQ
views. At the same time more than 70 percent of 
э Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie (FOM) survey in 
3T[JRGJWѦ5WTYXJSYF7TXXN^FS4UFXF^ZYX^F
:LWT_^2FXXMYFGSTN;TNS^XT8YWFSFRN3&94ѧў
Percent of Russians Fear the Threat of large-Scale War 
with NATO, RIA-Novosti, November 8, 2016, Available 
here: MYYUXWNFWZXTHNJY^
those surveyed by FOM objected to Russia using 
SZHQJFW \JFUTSX ܪWXY NS F HTSܫNHY \MNHM NX STY
NSQNSJ\NYMTKܪHNFQLT[JWSRJSYUTQNH^UJWHJSY
of those surveyed believed nuclear use would 
have catastrophic consequences for humankind. 
Yet support for the early elimination of nuclear 
weapons is virtually non-existent. In 2000, 76 
percent of the Russian public believed that 
nuclear weapons have a central role in ensuring 
YMJ XJHZWNY^ TK YMJNW HTZSYW^ FSI YMFY ܪLZWJ MFX
increased since then.6 Even the Russian Orthodox 
Church openly endorses nuclear deterrence as 
a necessary and temporary evil until such time 
when human nature improves.7 .S XMTWY TKܪHNFQ
opposition to TPNW enjoys the support of the 
Russian public and stronger support from the 
expert and religious communities. Both suggest 
that the current policy is unlikely to change in the 
foreseeable future. 
1T\PJ^TUUTXNYNTS
9MJܪSFQFXUJHY\MNHMXJYX7ZXXNFFUFWYKWTRYMJ
other NWS is the curiously restrained reaction 
to the completion of the ban treaty negotiations, 
especially compared to the United States, Great 
Britain, and France, who almost immediately 
issued a joint statement strongly criticizing the 
ban treaty. There have been very few Russian 
TKܪHNFQ XYFYJRJSYX FGTZY YMJ GFS YWJFY^ FSI NS
most cases these have emphasized what Moscow 
considers the “correct” approach to nuclear 
disarmament rather than explicitly criticizing the 
approach embodied in the ban treaty.
  
html); VTSIOM survey in May 2017 (“Poll: Russians 
See Biggest WMD Threats Coming from US, Al-Qaida, 
‘Chechens’”, June 12, 2017, Available here: https://
www.russiamatters.org/blog/poll-russians-see-
biggest-wmd-threats-coming-us-al-qaida-chechens). 
э Rossiyane o Yadernom Oruzhii i Yadernykh 
Ugrozakhj. Moscow: PIR Center, 2000.
э Rossii Poka Neobkhodimo Yadernoe 
Oruzhie – Patriarkh Kirill. RIA Novosti, 
September 11, 2009 (Available here: http://ria.ru/
XTHNJY^.html) 
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The Foreign Ministry’s position paper on the 
implementation of Article VI of the NPT published 
shortly after the completion of the TPNW, in July 
2017, did not make a single reference to the 
treaty. It stated that the “reduction and limitation 
of nuclear arsenals must be implemented in a 
way that facilitates the strengthening of strategic 
stability and the growth of the security of all 
states without exception.”8 Similarly, the head of 
the Russian delegation to the 2017 Preparatory 
Committee to the 2020 NPT Review Conference, 
Mikhail Ulyanov, proclaimed that “realistic politics 
assumes the need of comprehensive accounting 
KTW FQQ KFHYTWX YMFY NSܫZJSHJ XYWFYJL^ XYFGNQNY^
and international security… there is no place for 
approaches that might be noble, but are detached 
from reality.”9
Only in rare cases when a clearer statement could 
not be avoided would Russian representatives 
publicly indicate their negative attitude. One such 
case was the statement of the Russian Permanent 
Representative to international organizations in 
Vienna, Ambassador Vladimir Voronkov who in 
no uncertain terms condemned proposals to use 
.&*&XFKJLZFWIXKTW YMJUZWUTXJXTK[JWNܪHFYNTS
of the ban treaty declaring that “the initiators 
of the convention challenge the fundamental 
principles of the IAEA safeguards system by 
watering down its goals and tasks.”10 Even in that 
э “Voprosy Yadernogo Razoruzheniya” (Issues 
Related to Nuclear Disarmament), July 6, 2017, 
Available here: http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/
international_safety/disarmament/-/asset_publisher/
WUܪ:'R&3F-HTSYJSYNI    
э Statement by Mikhail Ulyanov at the First 
Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 
2020 NPT Review Conference, Vienna, May 2, 2017 
(Available here: http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/
international_safety/disarmament/-/asset_publisher/
WUܪ:'R&3F-HTSYJSYNI) 
э A statement of the Governor representing the 
Russian Federation during a meeting of the IAEA 
Board of Governors in response to an offer to the IAEA 
to participate in negotiations on a convention on the 
UWTMNGNYNTSTKSZHQJFW\JFUTSX;NJSSF/ZSJ
case, the Russian representative refrained from 
directly opposing the ban treaty’s negotiations 
QNRNYNSLMNXNSYJW[JSYNTSYTFXUJHNܪHNXXZJ
In the end, the most comprehensive public 
statement of the Russian attitude toward the ban 
treaty was presented interview of Ambassador 
Mikhail Ulyanov in September 2017.11 That is, 
several months after the negotiations concluded, 
in an interview to a newspaper rather than in an 
TKܪHNFQ XYFYJRJSY FSI G^ F HMNJK TK F KTWJNLS
ministry department instead of the President 
or the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Foreign 
Minister spoke about it only in October 2017. 
There had been plenty of opportunities to express 
the Russian position earlier, but Moscow had 
HFWJKZQQ^ F[TNIJI NY 9MJ WJFXTSX FWJ INKܪHZQY YT
determine with any degree of certainty. Without 
doubt, however, attempts to downplay Russian 
opposition do not indicate even a very remote 
possibility that Moscow might suddenly support 
the ban treaty. A more likely explanation is the 
desire to avoid unnecessarily antagonizing some 
of the more vocal proponents of early nuclear 
disarmament who are important for Russian 
foreign policy in other areas, countries such as 
Egypt, Iran and Mexico. Moscow preferred to 
downplay its disagreement to prevent detracting 
from potential cooperation in a variety of other 
policy area. This continued until Moscow could 
better assess the degree of importance these 
countries attach to the ban treaty and seemingly 
determine that open opposition to the TPNW 
would not have an adverse effect on bilateral 
cooperation. That explanation is consistent with 
its greater sensitivity to positions of non-aligned 
countries at international organizations, in 
particular the IAEA, where Russia seeks to present 
itself as the defender of developing states from 
Available here: http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/
international_safety/disarmament/-/asset_publisher/
WUܪ:'R&3F-HTSYJSYNI 
э “Zapret Yadernogo Oruzhiya Protivorechit 
Natsionalnym Interesam Rossii” (A Ban on Nuclear 
Weapons Contradicts National Interests of Russia). 
Kommesant-Daily, September 12, 2017 (Available here: 
MYYUX\\\PTRRJWXFSYWZITH$Y\)
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assertive US behaviour. 
.SFS^J[JSY7ZXXNFѣX QT\UWTܪQJ\NYMWJXUJHY YT
criticising the ban treaty should not conceal a 
simple fact: there are few countries in the world that 
oppose the TPNW as strongly and consistently as 
Russia. It believes nuclear weapons are essential 
for its security and perhaps even its existence. 
The public and the elite support the government 
on this assessment. In fact, it would take a major 
improvement in international relations and radical 
reduction of tensions - to such an extent which 
is plainly not feasible in the near future - to make 
Russia more actively pursue major reduction of 
nuclear weapons. Therefore, nuclear disarmament 
seems out of the question. 
One remaining question is whether Russia will 
actively oppose the ban treaty. Its low-key reaction 
thus far suggests that it will not. Rather it will most 
likely remain silent and pretend that the ban treaty 
does not exist. It will try to stay away from public 
debates and will not openly oppose the measure 
itself nor the non-nuclear states which promote it. 
Ignoring an issue is rarely a good policy but this 
is the best that Russia can do now. It will happily 
cede active opposition to others, the United States 
in particular. 
“As relations between 
Russia and the West 
continue to deteriorate, 
prospects for nuclear 
disarmament will only 
worsen.”
As relations between Russia and the West continue 
to deteriorate, prospects for nuclear disarmament 
will only worsen. There is no appetite on part of 
FS^ 3<8 YT HTSXNIJW XNLSNܪHFSY WJIZHYNTSX FSI
Russia is perhaps one of the most unwilling. Yet, 
given the apparent sensitivity of Moscow toward 
some of countries that led the nuclear ban treaty 
JKKTWY NYHTZQIGJSJܪYKWTRYFPNSLXYJUXYMFYFWJ
symbolic or at least do not threaten the core of 
NYX SZHQJFW RNXXNTSX & MNLMQJ[JQ HTSܪWRFYNTS
of its intention to reduce its reliance on nuclear 
weapons in the future could be helpful. Even 
more helpful would be a statement that changing 
nuclear doctrine would open the possibility 
for further the reduction of nuclear arsenals. 
Although the Conference on Disarmament (CD) 
in Geneva remains deadlocked and cooperation 
between the United States and Russia has fallen 
YT F SJ\ QT\ F WJFKܪWRFYNTS TK HTRRNYRJSY
to advancing the CD agenda or even better, a 
realistic sounding initiative, especially the Fissile 
Materials Cut-Off Treaty, could also help alleviate 
the pressure created by the ban treaty and also 
help to strengthen Article VI. Russia could also 
seek to play a more active role in consultations on 
the weapons of mass destruction free zone in the 
Middle East, leveraging its strong relations with 
both Israel and Iran. 
Nuclear weapons have global implications but 
decisions about them are made by states on a 
national level and the international community 
HFS TSQ^ YW^ YT ܪSI \F^X YT NSܫZJSHJ YMJR
Unfortunately, the ban treaty initiative has not 
reached its goal. Perhaps it was timing: it is 
INKܪHZQY YT ܪSI F UJWNTI TK YNRJ J[JS NSHQZINSL
the worst days of the Cold War, when NWS would 
be less prepared to entertain deep reduction and 
disarmament. Perhaps it was the shortcomings 
of the text itself. In any event, all, NWS have 
rejected the initiative, although the manner of that 
rejection has differed from one state to another 
and rejection was individual (Russia) or in a group 
:8+WFSHJ:0NSXYJFITKFHTRRTS5UTXNYNTS
That does not make the rift between the NWS and 
the group of NNWS who pioneered the ban treaty 
any narrower or the choices of those NNWS who 
abstained from supporting the ban any easier.
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“No Nuclear Armed 
State, inside or outside 
the NPT, has indicated 
that it is awaiting a 
lead from the UK or 
France over its nuclear 
decisions”
Paul Schulte
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Paul Schulte1
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
(TPNW) is a coordinated attempt to force the 
global nuclear order towards total nuclear 
disarmament through a combination of moral 
suasion and politico-legal pressure on nuclear-
armed states (NASs). It is an indicator of the deep 
international frustration with the slow movement 
towards promised disarmament. But it is also a 
WZXMJI YJHMSNHFQQ^ ܫF\JI IJQNGJWFYJQ^ IN[NXN[J
and self-limiting diplomatic exploit which, in its 
present form, should be rigorously refuted.
+WFSHJ'WNYFNSFSIYMJ953<
The UK and France are similar in their current 
understanding and opposition to the TPNW. In 
HTSHJWY\NYMYMJ:8&YMJ^NXXZJIF5XYFYJRJSY
utterly rejecting the Treaty after its signature,2 
declaring they would never join or accept it as 
legally binding on them. Despite misgivings, the 
UK and the US were eventually prepared to attend 
the last of the preliminary conferences preceding 
э I’m extremely grateful for conversations and 
correspondence over the years with many experts on 
this and related subjects. Although word restrictions 
prevent me mentioning them by name, I think they will 
know who they are. But they are of course in no way 
responsible for the conclusions reached here. A fuller 
version of these arguments can be found at: http://
www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/government-society/
centres/iccs/research/groups/global-nuclear-order.
aspx.
э United States Mission to the United Nations, Joint 
Press Statement from the Permanent Representatives 
to the United Nations of the United States, United 
Kingdom, and France Following the Adoption of a 
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons, Available here:  
https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7892, 7 July 2017
formal negotiations under UN auspices, in Vienna 
NS )JHJRGJW  TS YMJ KFQXJ UWTRNXJ TK F
consensus outcome. France had been suspicious 
of legitimising a polarising majoritarian, conveyor 
belt negotiation process, aimed towards a 
nuclear weapons convention. France regards its 
HTSXNXYJSY GT^HTYY FX RTWJ YMFS OZXYNܪJI FSI
NATO positions are now aligned over the TPNW.
The UK and France occupy similar strategic 
positions, seeking to uphold a democratic 
transatlantic alliance, (although France does not 
assign its weapons to NATO). Both are cautious, 
status quo members of present nuclear order, to 
which they see no convincing alternative. They are 
legally recognised Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) 
in good standing with the world’s most important 
nuclear treaty, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT). In 2017, according to SIPRI, French 
FSI 'WNYNXM \FWMJFI YTYFQX \JWJ FY FWTZSI 
FSI  WJXUJHYN[JQ^ \NYM KJ\JW TUJWFYNTSFQQ^
available. These represent approximately half 
of their Cold War levels, together constituting 
KJ\JWYMFS
TKFLQTGFQYTYFQTKFWTZSI
weapons.
Against objective criteria of arsenal size, 
transparency, second strike stability, and 
avoidance of coercive threats or brinkmanship, 
France and the UK can claim to the unsurpassed 
in the responsibility with which they treat their 
nuclear status and capabilities. Although they 
continue to modernise their deterrents they can 
claim that this is observably different to nuclear 
arms racing and necessary to keep them safe, 
э SIPRI “Trends in World Nuclear Forces”, 2017, 
Available here:  https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/
ܪQJXKXDD\SKUIK&HHJXXJI
э4[JW
FWJMJQIG^7ZXXNFFSI&RJWNHF
Chinese, Israeli, Indian, Pakistani, and DPRK nuclear 
numbers remain undisclosed - and most are probably 
continuing to grow.
The UK, France and the Nuclear Ban 
Treaty
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secure and effective. They remain committed to 
good faith negotiations towards a denuclearised 
world. They have both supported, (and, in 2009, 
YMJ :0 NSNYNFQQ^ UWTUTXJI YMJ 5 5WTHJXX YT YW^
to progress multilateral NWS consultation and 
cooperation on disarmament - related issues. 
9MNX MFX GWTFIJSJI KWTR [JWNܪFGQJ \FWMJFI
dismantlement to common nuclear terminology 
TK YWFSXUFWJSH^ FSI UTXXNGQJ ܪXXNQJ RFYJWNFQ
production ban. Progress has been generally 
slower than hoped, with the pace set by the least 
transparent NWSs, usually thought to be Russia 
and China. 
Given their own small nuclear stockpiles and 
modest strategic roles, France and Britain lack 
QJ[JWFLJ YT RFPJ RFOTW HMFSLJX \NYMNS YMJ 5
process or in wider global nuclear arrangements. 
Although they are not blocking any wider move to 
a nuclear free world, campaigners call for them 
“to take the lead” in some new process which 
engages at least the NWSs if not all the NASs.
Yet, none of their previous nuclear reductions 
MF[J UWTIZHJI FS^ NIJSYNܪFGQJ NRUFHY TS TYMJW
states’ nuclear choices over horizontal or vertical 
proliferation. No NAS, inside or outside the NPT, 
has indicated that it is awaiting a lead from the UK 
or France over its nuclear decisions.
If Britain or France were now, against domestic 
democratic pledges, to accept TPNW injunctions 
and offer to eliminate, or never to use, their tiny 
percentages of the global nuclear weaponry, the 
disparity of commitment and capability between 
America and Europe in NATO would be dramatically 
accentuated and the east-west European nuclear 
balance seriously disturbed. According to their 
own consistent national defence analyses, this 
would critically reduce French and British security. 
No one expects reciprocal reductions.
э Andrea Berger and Malcolm Chalmers, 
Ѧ,WJFY*]UJHYFYNTSX9MJ55WTHJXXFSIYMJ3TS
5WTQNKJWFYNTS9WJFY^ѧ7:8.<MNYJMFQQ5FUJW3T
Available here: MYYUXWZXNTWLXNYJXIJKFZQYܪQJX
\MWDD\JGUIK 
5ZGQNH 4UNSNTS FSI *QJHYTWFQ
5TXXNGNQNYNJX
The TPNW negotiations have had little impact 
on public opinion in either country. Outside the 
disarmament community, electorates seem largely 
unaware of the treaty, although the award of the 
Nobel Peace Prize to the International Campaign 
against Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) gained some 
media attention. Major political parties in both 
countries remain almost uniformly committed to 
Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) status.
It is possible that a UK election might bring 
Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party to power, with a 
changed Parliamentary membership,  and that 
the TPNW might then offer an additional impetus 
to implement his long established unilateralist 
intention, overturning his party’s existing policy 
of maintaining and modernising the UK Trident 
nuclear system. However, the timing would have 
been determined by domestic politics, focusing on 
very different issues, rather than Treaty signature.
+ZSIFRJSYFQ4GOJHYNTSX
The TPNW, as a disarmament instrument, is 
intended to rupture any “tolerable accommodation 
of pronounced differences in the capabilities, 
practices, rights and obligations of states” 
essential to maintain global nuclear order.6 Yet, 
it provides no menu of alternatives to manage 
the various strategic anxieties or ambitions of 
NAS national security decision-makers. So it is - 
deliberately - objectionable to all nuclear states. 
Its negotiation failed to persuade a single NAS 
or ally to sign-even Norway, the Netherlands, or 
Japan. Its favoured “stigmatisation” of nuclear 
weapons has been ignored by both sides in the 
2017 Korean Crisis. It cannot become customary 
international law for those who will not sign it, 
and it is not based on any moral or demographic 
RFOTWNY^ XNLSFYTW^ XYFYJX HTRUWNXJ TSQ^ 

TK :3 UTUZQFYNTS HTRUFWJI YT 
 KTW STS
э  William Walker “A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear 
Weapons and International Order”, Routledge Taylor 
and Francis Group London and New York 2012, p180
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signatories).7
Overall, the TPNW campaign shirks the 
requirement for creative thinking to acknowledge, 
understand and overcome structural obstacles 
to transformative collective action. Instead, the 
TPNW’s strategy of undifferentiated popular 
pressure demands movement beyond the present 
disarmament stalemate, but fails to analyse 
where progress is most needed, who is blocking 
it, and which solutions might facilitate it.
It disregards the huge, unprecedented, technical 
FSI UTQNYNHFQ UWTGQJRX UTXJI G^ [JWNܪFGQJ
disarmament of nuclear weapons. It overlooks 
the daily demonstrated current weakness of the 
international institutions which would be required 
YTT[JWXJJFSIYMJSNSIJܪSNYJQ^LZFWFSYJJSZHQJFW
abolition. It offers no solutions to the systematic 
distrust which would overhang the compliance, 
if NASs could be induced to sign. (If they did, 
they would become subject to discriminatory 
[JWNܪHFYNTSXYFSIFWIXFSITGXYWZHYJINS\NYMIWF\FQ
if others cheated or even went to war with them.) 
It ignores moral differences between nuclear 
deterrence and nuclear intimidation, treats all 
NASs as equally dangerous in force postures and 
behaviours, and equally responsible for blocking 
disarmament. This is particularly unreasonable 
for the UK and France, who cannot hope to affect 
decisions of countries in very different strategic 
situations and much more dependent on larger or 
expanding nuclear arsenals.
The TPNW exalts agency or “critical will”. But 
its evangelical voluntarism would unfold, if at 
all, with extreme, systematically perverse global 
variability among non-signatories. It would 
disproportionately affect the most scrupulous 
э Alyn Ware “The Ban Treaty and the Nuclear-Armed 
States: From Irrelevance to a Game-Changer” In-Depth 
News, 10 July 2017, Available here: https://www.
SZHQJFWFGTQNYNTSNSKTNSIJ]UMUYMJGFSYWJFY^
and-the-nuclear-armed-states-from-irrelevance-to-a-
game-changer&HHJXXJI
  
and democratic NASs and alliances. Its campaign 
rests upon an unconvincing future history, 
HTSܫFYNSL QJLNYNRFYJ FGTQNYNTSNXY J]MTWYFYNTS
with implausible prediction: the TPNW must be 
universally adopted because it will inevitably lead 
to accelerated total disarmament - apparently 
because 122 nations and some energetic 
international activist networks loudly claim that 
it should. (Yet repeatedly cited precedents such 
as cluster munitions, landmines, chemical and 
biological weapons are far from universally 
and reliably banned.) The TPNW text knowingly 
GFHPXQNIJX KWTR GJXY J]NXYNSL [JWNܪHFYNTS
standards, such as the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, 
which had evolved in response to proven 
clandestine attempts at nuclear breakout. Above 
all, while failing to eliminate a single nuclear 
weapon, if the TPNW were seriously internationally 
pressed, it would do harm: damaging nuclear non-
proliferation efforts by setting up an alternative 
treaty, asserting legal precedence over the NPT, 
competing with it for specialist resources and 
legitimacy, and  without requiring continued NPT 
membership for TPNW signatories.
+WJSHM FSI 'WNYNXM (MTNHJX ў
7JHTRRJSIFYNTSX
1. Tone and Audience
+WTR TKܪHNFQ +WJSHM FSI 'WNYNXM UJWXUJHYN[JX
therefore, there are overwhelmingly strong 
interlinked arguments against the TPNW. Their 
government representatives should not concede 
any moral superiority to its advocates. But 
judgement will be needed in deciding exactly 
which objections should be stressed and the tone 
NS\MNHMYTJ]UWJXXYMJRYTXUJHNܪHFZINJSHJX
• It may accordingly sometimes be 
prudent to deemphasise strong but 
provocative arguments so as to minimise 
the divisiveness which has been a 
deliberate campaigning strategy of the 
TPNW’s promoters. Sensitivity and restraint 
could assist joint work with moderately 
anti-nuclear states, to develop forward-
looking compromises. And, while energetic 
diplomatic and intellectual rebuttal over 
security realities is also required, it should 
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be expressed without undermining general 
HTSܪIJSHJNSNSYJWSFYNTSFQXYWZHYZWJX
and disarmament processes. Increased 
attention to nuclear issues created by 
the TPNW dispute could at least provide 
opportunities to point to constructive 
possibilities for real progress in creating 
preconditions for disarmament.
2. 2FNSYFNSNSL [JWNܪHFYNTS XYFSIFWIX NS F
deteriorating arms control environment
The sheer, indefensible, technical inadequacy of 
YMJ 953<ѣX WZXMJI [JWNܪHFYNTS FSI XFKJLZFWIX
provisions needs to be emphasised and 
J]UQFNSJINK\TWQI\NIJ[JWNܪHFYNTSXYFSIFWIXFWJ
to be maintained, against continual background 
pressures away from transparency in most 
arms control and disarmament regimes. The 
UK has been particularly interested in efforts to 
FI[FSHJNSYJWSFYNTSFQ[JWNܪHFYNTSRJYMTITQTLNJX
especially in the nuclear realm, with initiatives 
such as the UK Norway Project,8 which has been 
exploring how non-nuclear weapon states might 
participate in elimination of warheads, without 
revealing proliferation sensitive material.
.SYMJ:88YFYJ)JUFWYRJSYFSIYMJ3ZHQJFW
Threat Initiative inaugurated an International 
5FWYSJWXMNUKTW3ZHQJFW)NXFWRFRJSY;JWNܪHFYNTS
(IPNDV)9 FXXJXXNSL RTSNYTWNSL FSI [JWNܪHFYNTS
issues across the nuclear weapons lifecycle. Its 
initial focus is on potential options for monitoring 
э UK/ NOR/VERTIC Report, Presentation on the UK-
Norway Initiative on Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement 
;JWNܪHFYNTS&[FNQFGQJMJWJhttps://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
IFYFܪQJUWJXJSYFYNTSDTSDYMJDZPDSTW\F^D
initiative_on_nuclear_warhead_dismantlement_
[JWNܪHFYNTSUIK&HHJXXJI
э Nuclear Threat Initiative, INTERNATIONAL 
PARTNERSHIP FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
VERIFICATION ENGAGING A DIVERSE GROUP OF 
STATES TO DEVELOP INNOVATIVE MONITORING AND 
VERIFICATION SOLUTIONS, More information available 
here: http://www.nti.org/about/projects/international-
UFWYSJWXMNUSZHQJFWINXFWRFRJSY[JWNܪHFYNTS 
nuclear warhead dismantlement, the most 
demanding aspect of future nuclear reductions. 
Wider international participation in the IPNDV 
would be extremely desirable. It would spread 
ZSIJWXYFSINSLTK YMJZSFUUWJHNFYJIINKܪHZQYNJX 
related to political, proliferation and intelligence 
concerns. 
3. Addressing frustration over slow progress on 
disarmament
The TPNW’s signal of collective frustration 
has also to be taken seriously even though the 
message is (seemingly deliberately) not actionable 
in its present form. Resumed movement towards 
nuclear disarmament is essential, not just to 
save the NPT, but to reduce and manage nuclear 
dangers. The TPNW is evidence that NNWS 
patience with the step-by-step approach towards 
disarmament has seriously eroded.
As both governments have repeatedly indicated, 
ending the general stalemate in nuclear 
reductions would be entirely in French and British 
interests. Achieving a positive result or at least 
minimising damage at the 2020 NPT Prep Com 
is an important goal for both countries, the NATO 
Alliance, and the entire international system. But 
F ܪWXY XYJU YT HMFSLJ NX WJFHMNSL FHHZWFYJ FSI
widely shared analyses of current problems. 
Recognising the interlocking limitations of the 
present security environment does not mean 
permanently accepting them.
“Recognising the 
interlocking limitations 
of the present security 
environment does not 
mean permanently 
accepting them.”
  
In concert with allies, the UK and France should 
therefore conduct or intensify discrete soundings 
with moderate states and organisations 
supporting the TPNW, in advance of the 2018 UN 
High Level Conference on Nuclear Disarmament, 
and the 2020 NPT Review Conference, to examine 
the extent of agreement over the key obstacles to 
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change in the nuclear order and how these might 
be removed. Here, wider passions raised by the 
TPNW might help in moving things forward if they 
can be focused effectively. Looking for common 
understandings and practical cooperation will 
indicate whether key TPNW sponsors and 
advocates genuinely want to reduce global risks 
from nuclear weapons or simply use the Treaty 
to amplify resentments at such a symbolically 
salient form of global inequality.
What can be done now to achieve practical 
RT[JRJSY$ <MT NX GQTHPNSL PJ^ XYJUX YT\FWIX
FYYFNSFGQJ INXFWRFRJSY$ -T\ HFS YMJNW
OZXYNܪHFYNTSX FSI ZSIJWQ^NSL RTYN[JX GJ GJXY
ZSIJWXYTTI$ &WJ YMJ^ XZXHJUYNGQJ YT RT[JRJSY
through international lobbying and diplomatic 
UWJXXZWJXTKYMJPNSIJS[NXFLJINSYMJ953<$.K
XT MT\ HFS YMFY HFRUFNLS GJ GJXY RTGNQNXJI$
There is no shortage of potentially productive 
areas or initiatives.
The most critical blockages are likely to be the 
traditional disarmament agenda items:
Reducing nuclear superpower warhead numbers 
by ending the U.S.-Russia stalemate over 
strategic reductions. Renewed U.S.-Russian 
strategic stability talks were announced in 
September 2017 and exacerbated international 
pressures may now have some opportunity 
to take effect. Clearly British and French 
governments would favour a deal and have made 
this clear in various fora. But American offers of 
symmetrical major reductions have been on the 
table for some years and open Franco - British 
government statements pressing for rapid, 
unbalanced movement in this most sensitive 
strategic area would be counter-productive if 
public and ignored in private.
&HMNJ[NSLZSN[JWXFQWFYNܪHFYNTSFSIXNLSFYZWJTK
(9'9FSIHTRUQJYNTSTKNYX[JWNܪHFYNTSWJLNRJ 
UK and French support for CTBT is well known. 
It should be continued, though most effectively 
behind the scenes. Past public pressures from 
Allies have not been well received by the US 
Senate which has prevented US government 
WFYNܪHFYNTS*[JSNKYMNXMZWIQJ\JWJT[JWHTRJ
DPRK, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and 
Pakistan would also have to ratify before the 
CTBT could enter into force. (India, North 
Korea and Pakistan have still to sign it) France 
and Britain will remain part of the diplomatic 
coalition pushing for universalisation, but they 
have no obvious way of prevailing over domestic 
opposition by holdouts.
Ending Pakistani obstruction over Fissile 
Material Cut-Off and the long inactivity of the 
Conference on Disarmament.
A recurrent dilemma emerges for many of 
the options. Overt international pressure on 
individual nuclear actors to stop blocking 
disarmament may lead to angry recrimination 
which would worsen the atmosphere for any kind 
TK55WTHJXXTWKTWHTTUJWFYNTS\NYMSTS359
NASs. But that dilemma will eventually have to 
be addressed in some way if global attitudes are 
to be a factor in determining the nuclear future, 
which is the obvious intention behind TPNW.
4. Responsible Nuclear Sovereignty
In addition to the familiar list above, there remains 
a major gap in the global conversation about 
Responsible Nuclear Sovereignty (RNS)10: how 
YT IJܪSJ YMJ UWNSHNUQJX G^ \MNHM 3&8X XMTZQI
be internationally judged on their conduct for the 
NSIJܪSNYJKZYZWJNS\MNHMSZHQJFWFWXJSFQXWJRFNS
France and Britain have every reason to wish to 
encourage or sponsor such a discussion and to 
involve non-nuclear states and disarmament 
organisations. It would address issues such as 
transparency and restraint in nuclear numbers, 
nuclear signalling (avoidance of intimidatory 
ѦXFGWJWFYYQNSLѧIJ[JQTUNSLSZHQJFWKTWHJX\NYM(
arrangements and basing modes which minimise 
YJRUYFYNTSX KTW ܪWXY XYWNPJ HTSXNXYJSY XZUUTWY
for diplomatic solutions, such as the NPT, and for 
genuinely effective nuclear security precautions, 
э Sebastian Brixey-Williams and Paul Ingram, 
Responsible Nuclear Sovereignty and the Future of the 
Global Nuclear Order, 6 February 2017, Available here: 
MYYU\\\GFXNHNSYTWLXNYJXIJKFZQYܪQJX'WN]J^
<NQQNFRX
FSI
.SLWFR
(
7JXUTSXNGQJ

3ZHQJFW
8T[JWJNLSY^
7JUTWY
5)+D+.3&1  
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non-proliferation policies and export controls. 
These are all areas in which the UK and France 
are role models and have practical experience to 
share.
5. Further Associated Work to Support Eventual 
Nuclear Disarmament
Unimpeded nuclear proliferation reduces any 
chance of nuclear disarmament. Seriously 
committed signatory states could therefore 
contribute to the eventual plausibility of the TPNW 
vision in a number of ways. The disturbingly rapid 
development of DPRK’s nuclear capabilities 
indicates how much needs to be done to tighten 
up export controls. But many TPNW signatory 
states have not introduced and enforced 
adequate nuclear export control regulations, and 
XMT\FXNLSNܪHFSYQ^\TWXJF[JWFLJUJWKTWRFSHJ
than non-signatories.11 The International Atomic 
Energy Agency should be adequately and reliably 
funded for its work in Iran, and its gold standard 
Additional Protocol should be universally signed.
A range of constructive ideas have also recently 
been developed by the Carnegie Endowment12 
proposing an improved analytic approach—a 
SZHQJFW ܪWJ\FQQџYT MJQU INXYNSLZNXM GJY\JJS
purely peaceful and weapons-related activities 
and programmes. Related suggestions include 
QJ[JQQNSL ZU YMJ SZHQJFW YWFIJ UQF^NSL ܪJQI
by consolidating widely recognized existing 
benchmarks for credible nuclear power programs, 
э Most Nuclear Ban Treaty Proponents are Lagging 
in Implementing Sound Export Control Legislation” 
by David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Allison Lach, and 
Andrea Stricker, Institute for Science and International 
Security, 27 September, 2017  
э Dalton, T et al, Report for Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, TOWARD A NUCLEAR 
FIREWALL Bridging the NPT’s Three Pillars, 
Available here: http://carnegieendowment.org/
ܪQJX(5DD)FQYTSDJYDFQD+NWJ\FQQD+NSFQD<JG
pdf   See also Levite, A and Dalton T, Leveling Up 
the Nuclear Trade Playing Field, 2017,  Available 
here: http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/09/07/
QJ[JQNSLZUSZHQJFWYWFIJUQF^NSLܪJQIUZG 
establishing consistency between the production 
TKܪXXNQJRFYJWNFQFSI WJFXTSFGQJHN[NQNFSSJJIX
and articulating a norm of self-restraint on nuclear 
weaponisation research and development.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative has made proposals 
on Negative Security Assurances (NSAs), 
which could be further examined in the CD, or 
conceivably within the NPT system, to assess 
the possibility of a single internationally legally 
binding instrument going beyond the existing 
UQJILJX G^ YMJ  359 3<8X 5TXNYN[J 8JHZWNY^
Assurances could be further examined, to provide 
assistance, in accordance with the UN Charter, to 
a NNWS victimised by an act or threat of nuclear 
aggression. This could help with the distressing 
potential problems which the Humanitarian 
Impacts Movement, precursor to the TPNW 
campaign, was ostensibly created to address, but 
over which absolutely nothing has been achieved.
6. Addressing military imbalances, advanced 
conventional weapons and growing systemic 
distrust
Finally, at the highest international level, there 
are widening background issues of military 
imbalances in different sectors; and increasing 
crossover between nuclear capabilities and 
advanced conventional strategic weapons with 
strategic impacts, especially long-range precision 
strike and missile defences. There is currently no 
forum where this expanding range of problems 
can be adequately addressed. Here France and 
Britain could work in support of the approach, 
developed in successive articles by Shultz, Perry, 
Kissinger, and Nunn, for a large-scale, long term, 
international Joint Enterprise effort with a major 
role for non-nuclear weapon states, to understand 
and control destructive, potentially overwhelming 
э Nuclear Threat Initiative, PROPOSED 
INTERNATIONALLY LEGALLY-BINDING NEGATIVE 
SECURITY ASSURANCES (NSAS),  May 2017, Available 
here: http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/
proposed-internationally-legally-binding-negative-
security-assurances/
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nuclear risks.
Ideally, further work would also discuss wider 
INXFWRFRJSY WJLNRJ [JWNܪHFYNTS YTLJYMJW
with (intensely contested) problems of dispute 
resolution over compliance, and reliable, non-
partisan, enforcement and global governance 
of WMD agreements. The hopeful multilateral 
achievements which accompanied the end 
of the Cold War, such as The INF Treaty, The 
Open Skies Agreement, The Vienna Document, 
the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, are now 
seriously threatened by withdrawals, refusals of 
transparency, obstruction and non-compliance, 
in ways which the TPNW completely ignores. Yet 
the eventual credibility of any future disarmament 
instruments will depend upon expectations of 
trustworthy international behaviour. Disarmament 
will not occur in a Post-Truth World. States 
supporting the TPNW should be reminded of this 
and encouraged to request full information and 
actively express reasoned opinions over the most 
IN[NXN[J FSI HTSܪIJSHJWJIZHNSL INXFWRFRJSY
issues, in view of their destructive wider impacts 
on the attainable nuclear future.
5WTXUJHYX
 
None of these complicated and painstaking 
activities will lead to the immediate abolition of 
any nuclear weapon. But neither, as everyone 
acknowledges, will the ban treaty. As responsible 
nuclear sovereigns - and unlike TPNW campaigners 
- the British and French governments will have to 
continue their search for dependable, rules-based 
security improvements within the limits of what 
major strategic actors are realistically prepared 
to accept. In doing so, they can reasonably point 
out how many important things could be achieved 
эJames E. Goodby and Steven Pifer “ Creating 
the Conditions for a World without Nuclear Weapons 
Ѧ(MFUYJWNS,JTWLJ8MZQY_FSI/FRJX,TTIG^
“The War That Must Never Be Fought: Dilemmas of 
Nuclear Deterrence” Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution 
5WJXX&[FNQFGQJKTWIT\SQTFIFYhttps://www.
brookings.edu/research/the-war-that-must-never-be-
fought-dilemmas-of-nuclear-deterrence/
to create a more propitious world for nuclear 
disarmament, eventually offering opportunities 
for  better designed treaties, if international 
energies are not divided and misdirected into 
acrimonious protest.
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“China could use 
the ban treaty as 
an opportunity to 
UWTRTYJFSTܪWXY
use policy among the 
other Nuclear Weapon 
States.”
Raymond Wang & Tong 
Zhao
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Raymond Wang & Dr Tong Zhao1
:SQNPJ YMWJJ TK NYX KJQQT\ 5 HTZSYWNJX YMJ
United Kingdom, France, and the United States) 
which released a harsh joint statement against 
the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on 7 July 2017,2 China 
has yet to publicly announce its position. While 
it boycotted the negotiations, the Chinese 
Government has so far been the least hostile of the 
ܪ[J3ZHQJFW<JFUTS8YFYJ3<8FIRNSNXYWFYNTSX
towards the treaty. China was the only country 
that did not vote against the TPNW negotiations 
at the UN General Assembly in 2016 and Foreign 
Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying stated on 
2FWHM YMFY YMJ(MNSJXJLTFQTKF ѦܪSFQ
comprehensive ban on and total destruction of 
nuclear weapons” was “fundamentally in line 
with the purposes of negotiations on the nuclear 
weapons ban treaty.”  
э This chapter has been adopted from the Policy 
'WNJKUZGQNXMJINS8JUYJRGJWG^YMJ&XNF5FHNܪH
Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
and Disarmament (APLN) and the Center for Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. ELN would like 
to express gratitude to the Authors and the APLN for 
agreeing to include it in this volume. The original paper 
is available at: MYYUFUQSTWLGWNJܪSLXGWNJܪSLXD
[NJ\5TQNH^D'WNJKD3TDDD(MNSFDFSIDYMJD3ZHQJFWD
<JFUTSXD5WTMNGNYNTSD9WJFY^$HPFYYJRUY" 
э “Joint Press Statement from the Permanent 
Representatives to the United Nations of the United 
States, United Kingdom, and France Following the 
Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons,” US 
State Department, 7 July 2017, https://usun.state.gov/
remarks/7892 
э Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s 
Regular Press Conference on 20 March, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 20 March 2017. 
MYYU\\\KRUWHLT[HSRKFDJSL]\K\D
XDYXMYRQ.  
However, in the present circumstances the treaty 
is as unacceptable to China as it is to the other 
nuclear armed states. China both possesses 
nuclear weapons and has a policy of retaliating 
with nuclear weapons only after a nuclear strike 
by an adversary. As such it cannot adhere to 
the treaty’s core prohibitions. Nevertheless, it 
broadly supports the spirit behind the TPNW and 
certain principles also align with its domestic and 
international policy goals.  
In practice, entry into force of the TPNW would 
not undermine China’s existing nuclear policies 
as long as it does not sign it. This leaves room 
for China to avoid denouncing the treaty while still 
being able to protect its key security interests. 
Looking to the future, China can and should seek 
to actively engage with the treaty and continue 
to promote disarmament as a non- Party to the 
TPNW.
“In practice, entry into 
force of the TPNW would 
not undermine China’s 
existing nuclear policies 
as long as it does not sign 
it.”
Although China will not have a legal obligation to 
implement the TPNW’s prohibitions, its interests 
and policies could nonetheless be affected. This 
is because legal obligations on the States Parties 
may make them adopt policy measures which 
HTZQI RFPJ NY INKܪHZQY KTW (MNSF YT RFNSYFNS NYX
existing nuclear posture. A potential concern 
would be over the issue of transit and stationing 
FX(MNSFMFXFLWT\NSLܫJJYTKSZHQJFWGFQQNXYNH
missile submarines (SSBN) which need to 
Similar language can also be found in China’s working 
paper submitted to the 2017 NPT PrepCom titled 
“Nuclear Disarmament and Reducing the Danger of 
3ZHQJFW<FWѧ359(43+5(.<5UFWF
China and the Nuclear Ban Treaty
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conduct patrols outside its territorial waters. This 
might be problematic should China’s neighbouring 
countries interpret the nuclear ban treaty to include 
an obligation for them to prevent the transit 
of Chinese SSBNs in their exclusive economic 
zones (EEZs). In that regard, Article 1(g) prohibits 
“stationing, installation or deployment” of any 
nuclear weapons in a State Party’s territory or 
OZWNXINHYNTS9MJYWJFY^TKKJWXSTXUJHNܪHIJܪSNYNTS
of “stationing,” but according to other international 
legal documents such as nuclear weapon free 
zone (NWFZ) treaties “stationing” usually refers 
to “implantation, emplacement, transport on land 
or inland waters, stockpiling, storage, installation 
and deployment.” According to this common 
IJܪSNYNTS HTSIZHYNSL 88'3 UFYWTQX NS FSTYMJW
country’s EEZ is not explicitly prohibited, as under 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, EEZs 
only grant states limited jurisdiction that does not 
include exclusive passage rights. Furthermore, 
efforts during the negotiation of the nuclear ban 
treaty to explicitly include “transit” in Article 1(g) 
as part of a prohibition on “assistance” failed. 
This means the prohibition in the ban treaty on 
assisting nuclear weapon activities does not 
translate into an obligation on States Parties to 
ensure that SSBNs of non-parties cannot transit 
their EEZs.
(MNSFHFSGJSJܪYKWTRYMJRTRJSYZRHWJFYJIG^
the ban treaty in areas where positions are aligned 
and where China can make concrete contributions 
in the spirit of the treaty.  
The prohibition of the threat of use of nuclear 
weapons is provided in Article 1(d) and is an 
FWJF TK XNLSNܪHFSY T[JWQFU GJY\JJS (MNSJXJ
and the TPNW. China is the only NWS with an 
ZSHTSINYNTSFQFSIXTQJUZWUTXJSTܪWXYZXJ3+:
policy.  Furthermore, there is a difference between 
a NFU policy and a prohibition on the threat of use. 
After all, China is still threatening to use nuclear 
weapons in retaliation against a nuclear attack. 
э See NWFZ treaties such as the Bangkok Treaty, 
the Treaty of Pelindaba etc. Treaty texts can be 
found at the UNODA website. https://www.un.org/
disarmament/wmd/nuclear/nwfz/ 
э&WYG:3(TS[JSYNTSTSYMJ1F\TKYMJ8JF
That said however, China’s “threat of use” only 
applies to other nuclear possessor states and only 
to scenarios where another country has crossed 
YMJSZHQJFW YMWJXMTQIܪWXYFLFNSXY(MNSF&3+:
policy towards all non-NWS and nuclear weapons 
KWJJ_TSJXNXFQTLNHFQFSIXNLSNܪHFSYXYJUYT\FWIX
achieving a comprehensive prohibition on the 
threat of use. Indeed, within the NPT processes 
China has consistently called on the other nuclear 
weapon states to “unequivocally undertake not to 
GJ YMJ ܪWXY YT ZXJ SZHQJFW \JFUTSX FY FS^ YNRJ
and under any circumstance, and undertake 
unconditionally not to use or threaten to use 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon 
States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.”6 
“China could use the ban 
treaty as an opportunity YT UWTRTYJ F STܪWXYZXJ
policy among the other 
nuclear weapon states.” 
China could use the ban treaty as an opportunity 
YTUWTRTYJFSTܪWXYZXJUTQNH^FRTSLYMJTYMJW
nuclear weapon states. In more concrete terms, 
instead of submitting a working paper alone, as it 
has traditionally done so in past NPT conferences, 
China could co-sponsor working papers on no-
ܪWXYZXJ\NYMYMJHTZSYWNJXYMFYJRGWFHJYMJNIJF
Domestically, it can also use this as evidence 
of the international support of its NFU policy 
and thus its restrained posture. This is a strong 
counter-argument against those who hope to 
see China adopt an escalated nuclear posture. 
.S  YMJ (MNSF &HFIJR^ TK 2NQNYFW^ 8HNJSHJ
(AMS) published The Science of Military Strategy, 
in which the authors suggested that China could 
move towards a “launch on warning” posture, 
SFRJQ^ ѦZSIJW HTSINYNTSX HTSܪWRNSL YMJ JSJR^
has launched nuclear missiles against us, before 
the enemy nuclear warheads have reached their 
targets and effectively exploded, before they have 
caused us actual nuclear damage, quickly launch 
э “Security Assurances,” NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/
<5
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a nuclear missile retaliatory strike.”7 
Furthermore, some argue that military capability 
developments in the United States, such as 
advancements in ballistic missile defence and 
conventional precision strike weapons will 
erode the strategic balance between the United 
States and China. This concern is exacerbated 
by the fact that the United States refuses to 
acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China. 
The policy debate is still ongoing. Although it has 
STYGJHTRJTKܪHNFQUTQNH^FSNSHWJFXNSLSZRGJW
of voices have recently advocated for China to 
XNLSNܪHFSYQ^NSHWJFXJYMJWTQJTKSZHQJFW\JFUTSX
and to greatly expand its nuclear arsenal. In 
this regard, the ban treaty is a strong political 
argument against escalating China’s existing 
nuclear posture. To date, the TPNW is the most 
comprehensive legal instrument that seeks to 
minimize the role of nuclear weapons by explicitly 
prohibiting the threat of use of nuclear weapons, 
and enjoys overwhelming international support.8  
Looking to the future, China can and should take a 
number of additional measures to promote nuclear 
disarmament and to narrow the gap between itself 
and the ban treaty’s supporters. China should 
participate in State Party Meetings as an observer, 
FXUWT[NIJIKTW NS&WYNHQJ4GXJW[JWXHFSSTY
make statements or interventions, but if the 
nuclear ban treaty follows NPT customs, observer 
states can circulate their own documentation at 
their own cost during the event.9 Side events with 
informal rules of procedure can further facilitate 
cooperation between non-NWS and China. 
Moreover, in the treaty’s text, there is no further 
JQFGTWFYNTSTS[JWNܪHFYNTSTKSZHQJFWINXFWRFRJSY
э Gregory Kulacki, China’s Military Calls for Putting 
its Nuclear Forces on Alert, Union of Concerned 
8HNJSYNXYX/FSZFW^U
э Certain NWFZ treaties also have a similar 
prohibition, but only have regional membership. 
э Tariq Rauf, “Preparing for the 2017 NPT 
Preparatory Committee Session: The Enhanced 
8YWJSLYMJSJI7J[NJ\5WTHJXXѧ8.57.'WNJK
February 2017. 
other than it will be undertaken by a “competent 
authority.” There are technical reasons for this 
vague wording. Current technological capabilities 
present a trade-off between the correctness and 
NSYWZXN[JSJXX TK INXFWRFRJSY [JWNܪHFYNTS FSI
there is a lack of “ready-to-deploy technologies 
YT XZUUTWY RTSNYTWNSL FSI [JWNܪHFYNTS FHYN[NYNJX
associated with nuclear weapons in storage 
or to authenticate an item declared to be a 
nuclear warhead.”10 Even with less intrusive 
methods, sensitive data is still collected, albeit 
with information barriers that would keep this 
information from the inspecting party.11 The 
nuclear ban treaty will eventually have to confront 
these issues, and to this end, China can play a more 
active role in multilateral efforts on disarmament 
[JWNܪHFYNTS
There are some areas where further research 
HTZQI FI[FSHJ INXFWRFRJSY [JWNܪHFYNTS +TW
example, scholars have proposed a “zero-
knowledge protocol” that could assess the 
authenticity of a “physics package” of a warhead 
without collecting sensitive information in the 
ܪWXY UQFHJ +TW NSXYFSHJ F YJFR FY 5WNSHJYTS
University demonstrated, on an experimental 
level, the feasibility of this approach for warhead 
[JWNܪHFYNTS12 A more recent initiative called 
CONFIDANTE at Sandia Labs is also exploring 
a new approach based on the zero-knowledge 
э Martin Rioux-Lefebvre, Andrew Newman and 
Andrew Bieniaski, “Progress Under the International 
5FWYSJWXMNUKTW3ZHQJFW)NXFWRFRJSY;JWNܪHFYNTSѧ
5FUJWXZGRNYYJIYTYMJth Institute of Nuclear 
Materials Management Annual Meeting Proceedings, 
July 2017. http://www.nti.org/media/documents/
NTI_INMM_IPNDV_Paper_Jul2017.pdf 
э Alexander Glaser and Yan Jie, “Nuclear Warhead 
;JWNܪHFYNTS&7J[NJ\TK&YYWNGZYJFSI9JRUQFYJ
8^XYJRXѧ8HNJSHJ,QTGFQ8JHZWNY^UU
ў
э Sébastien Philippe, et al., “A physical zero-
knowledge object-comparison system for nuclear 
\FWMJFI[JWNܪHFYNTSѧ3FYZWJ(TRRZSNHFYNTSX
September 2016), p. 12890. 
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protocol. Further research on scalability and 
reference item criteria can be a potential area of 
HTTUJWFYNTS .S YMJXJ FWJFX HTSܪIJSHJGZNQINSL
measures between non-NWS and NWS can help 
GWNILJ YMJ HTSܪIJSHJ LFU HWJFYJI G^ YJHMSNHFQ
limitations, which can also make inspections 
more acceptable. 
Currently, the main multilateral initiatives in this 
ܪJQI FWJ YMJ :8QJI .SYJWSFYNTSFQ 5FWYSJWXMNU KTW
3ZHQJFW)NXFWRFRJSY;JWNܪHFYNTS.53); and 
UK–Norway Initiative. Of these two only the 
UK–Norway Initiative has an ongoing project on 
information barriers16 and the present political 
climate in the United States may limit the 
resources available to the IPNDV. As such, there 
NXFLFUYMFY(MNSFNX\JQQJVZNUUJIYTܪQQ9TIFYJ
China has mostly been conducting independent 
research at the China Academy of Engineering 
Physics.17 Joint research with other countries or 
organizations is taking place but only to a limited 
extent. 
China can either engage with existing initiatives, 
partner with relevant programs, or create its own 
initiative, preferably with non-NWS partners. A 
greater level of Chinese support through these 
channels in the research areas mentioned above 
will help lay the technical foundations for a 
[JWNܪFGQJINXFWRFRJSY WJLNRJ NS YMJ KZYZWJFSI
help build its image as an important partner and 
э “Overcoming the trust barrier in nuclear weapons 
[JWNܪHFYNTSXRJFXZWJRJSYXѧ8FSINF1FGX3J\X
Releases, Sandia Labs, 6 June 2017, Available here:  
https://share-ng.sandia.gov/news/resources/news_
WJQJFXJX\FWMJFID[JWNܪHNFYNTS<>,I\Y4,47X 
э US Department of State, International Partnership 
KTW3ZHQJFW)NXFWRFRJSY;JWNܪHFYNTS.53);
Available here: https://www.state.gov/t/avc/ipndv/ 
э United Kingdom – Norway Initiative, 2007, 
Available here: www.ukni.info 
э United Kingdom – Norway Initiative, Information 
Barrier, 2007, Available here: http://ukni.info/project/
information-barrier/  
э,QFXJWFSI>FSѦ3ZHQJFW<FWMJFI;JWNܪHFYNTSѧ
U
promoter of international nuclear disarmament. 
China can also support some of the positive 
obligations the nuclear ban treaty creates for 
States Parties providing “age- and gender-
sensitive assistance” to “individuals under its 
jurisdiction who are affected by the use or testing 
of nuclear weapons.” Also, China can provide 
YJHMSNHFQJIZHFYNTSFQFSIܪSFSHNFQFXXNXYFSHJNS
a transparent manner to those countries requiring 
such assistance. For instance, China can help 
Pakistan and Kazakhstan to take “necessary and 
appropriate measures towards environmental 
remediation of areas so contaminated by nuclear 
testing even through certain regional framework, 
such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 
This can help reduce geopolitical concerns 
from Russia and other regional stakeholders. 
Of course, China can go beyond assistance to 
these two countries. Indeed, there is presently 
STRZQYNQFYJWFQNSNYNFYN[JXUJHNܪHFQQ^KTW[NHYNRXTK
nuclear testing. This is an area where China can 
make a substantive contribution. 
As China seeks to play 
a leadership role in 
global governance it 
can and should engage 
proactively with the 
international community 
on disarmament issues 
that help narrow the gap 
between NWS and non-
NWS.
In conclusion, cooperating with non-NWS through 
the prism of the nuclear ban treaty is in line with 
China’s long-term interests. While regretting that 
Chinese accession to the TPNW is impossible 
at present, certain provisions are compatible 
with Chinese policy goals. The treaty does not 
negatively affect China’s existing nuclear policies 
as a non-State Party. For these reasons, China 
does not need to respond harshly to the TPNW 
and should develop a forward-looking policy to 
further promote nuclear disarmament. 
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As China seeks to play a leadership role in global 
governance it can and should engage proactively 
with the international community on disarmament 
issues that help narrow the gap between NWS 
and non-NWS. Responding positively to the ban 
treaty and building on its momentum to promote 
disarmament is a necessary step to preserve the 
international consensus on disarmament and 
can be an important indicator of China’s global 
leadership.
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“Tokyo evaluates 
that the ban treaty 
will neither promote 
nuclear disarmament 
nor improve Japan’s 
security situation.”
Hirofumi Tosaki
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/FUFS WJFKܪWRJI NYX IJHNXNTS YT STY XNLS YMJ
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
(TPNW) when it was adopted on 7 July 2017. Both 
domestic and international proponents of the 
treaty have moved to criticize this decision. As the 
only country which has suffered the consequences 
of nuclear attacks, Japan has been a long-time 
advocate for the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons. However, the decision not to support 
the treaty is not wholly unexpected. Japan voted 
against the 2016 UN General Assembly resolution 
to convene the conference to negotiate the legal 
prohibition of nuclear weapons. It also refused to 
participate in the negotiations after delivering a 
XYFYJRJSY TS YMJ NSNYNFQ IF^ TK YMJ ܪWXY WTZSI NS
March 2017.1     
/FUFSѣXTUUTXNYNTSYTYMJGFSYWJFY^
Tokyo has issued a number of public statements 
explaining why it cannot support the ban treaty. In 
its March 2017 statement, it argued, inter alia, that 
a nuclear ban treaty would not resolve serious 
security concerns nor lead to the actual elimination 
of a single nuclear warhead. It also argued that the 
negotiation format was not conducive to pursuing 
nuclear disarmament measures in cooperation 
with the nuclear-armed states. It contended that 
the adoption of the treaty without the involvement 
of nuclear-armed states would only widen the 
divisions between nuclear-armed states and non-
nuclear-weapon states as well as among the non-
nuclear-weapon states themselves.2  
Furthermore, the implications of the ban treaty 
vis-à-vis US extended nuclear deterrence also 
э Statement by H.E. Mr. Nobushige Takamizawa, 
at the High-level Segment of the United Nations 
conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to 
prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total 
elimination, March 27, 2017, New York.
э ibid
factors into Japanese thinking. Japan’s three 
neighbours, North Korea, China and Russia, 
whose relationship with Japan is unstable at 
the best times, all possess nuclear weapons. 
Japan faces very serious security threats from 
North Korea which has been aggressively testing 
nuclear and ballistic missiles and threatening the 
United States, South Korea and Japan. Under such 
circumstances, Tokyo considers the US nuclear 
umbrella indispensable for its defence, at least 
ZSYNQXZHMSZHQJFWYMWJFYXMF[JGJJSXNLSNܪHFSYQ^
reduced.
“Tokyo evaluates that 
the ban treaty will 
neither promote nuclear 
disarmament nor improve 
Japan’s security situation.”
In short, Tokyo evaluates that the ban treaty will 
neither promote nuclear disarmament nor improve 
Japan’s security situation. It is evident that the 
government believes that acceding to the treaty 
will weaken Japan’s national security. Hibakusha 
and some Japanese and international NGOs 
which have been promoting the TPNW have been 
calling on the Japanese government to support 
it. However, their arguments are not supported by 
Japan’s ruling party, some opposition parties or 
the general public.
*KKJHYN[JSJXX
In the Japanese government’s view, adopting the 
ban treaty does not represent a practical nuclear 
disarmament measure, not for the foreseeable 
future at least. It believes that the treaty is 
unlikely to bring about the reduction in numbers 
and salience of nuclear weapons, or even small 
disarmament concessions from nuclear-armed 
states. All of Japan’s nuclear-armed neighbours 
are continuing to develop their nuclear arsenals 
despite accelerating efforts to conclude the 
treaty.   
Ban treaty proponents claim that they do not 
expect an immediate accession by any of 
Japan and the Nuclear Ban Treaty
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the nuclear-armed states to the treaty. Yet, 
they maintain that the nuclear-armed states 
cannot ignore the treaty’s existence. They are 
attempting to reframe the nuclear narrative from 
a national security focus to one emphasizing 
the humanitarian considerations by stigmatizing 
nuclear weapons and promoting prohibition 
norms. The proponents believe that either sooner 
or later the nuclear-armed states will modify their 
behaviour and policies on nuclear weapons. 
“Japan’s authoritarian 
nuclear armed neighbours 
tend to be less sensitive 
to external pressures 
of a prohibition norm 
and are also less likely 
to be pressured by their 
domestic audiences.”
Yet, recent balance of power transitions and 
geopolitical tensions in Asia mean that nuclear-
armed states are placing greater weight on the 
security and political role of nuclear arsenals. 
Moreover, Japan’s authoritarian nuclear-armed 
neighbours tend to be less sensitive to external 
pressures of a prohibition norm and are also 
less likely to be pressured by their domestic 
audiences. Japan fully recognizes the importance 
of humanitarian consequences of the use of 
nuclear weapons. Yet its national security cannot 
be reliant on the distant prospect of the eventual 
acceptance of a prohibition norm by the nuclear-
armed states.
Establishing international norms including those 
banning chemical and biological weapons, land 
mines and cluster munitions were successful in 
not eroding the international order, or jeopardizing 
the national security interests of sovereign states. 
A norm on banning nuclear weapons is different. 
For nuclear-armed states to accept this norm 
would require a fundamental change of their 
perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons in their 
national security.
Furthermore, the ban treaty neither provides 
effective measures for the enforcement of the 
compliance of its states parties nor does it 
address the nuclear threats posed by nuclear-
armed states which sit outside the treaty. 
Therefore Japan is sceptical that the treaty will 
be effective in maintaining its national security 
against existing and future nuclear threats.  
*]YJSIJISZHQJFWIJYJWWJSHJ
Until appropriate means of dealing with nuclear 
threats are found, Tokyo will not be able to 
renounce its reliance on U.S. extended nuclear 
deterrence. Tokyo considers that in the current 
security situation adherence to the nuclear ban 
treaty will not provide an effective means of 
managing these threats. On the contrary, should 
Japan join the treaty, which obliges it to renounce 
its reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence, 
this may weaken its security.  
It is important to note however that Japan’s 
rejection of joining the ban treaty does not mean 
that it has the intention nor is contemplating the 
possibility of acquiring its own nuclear capability. 
Amid the deteriorating security environment 
and increasing nuclear threats, the Japanese 
government has dismissed the idea that Japan 
should abandon or modify its Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles of not possessing, not producing 
and not permitting the introduction of nuclear 
weapons. Tokyo maintains that to counter the 
threat of nuclear weapons, “extended deterrence 
provided by the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its 
core is indispensable” for its national security. 
As nuclear threats expand and as the United 
States completes its review of its nuclear posture, 
Japan’s highest priority is to sustain and bolster 
the credibility of American extended nuclear 
deterrence. It is reasonable to conclude that the 
Japanese and joint Japanese-U.S. conventional 
forces will play a primary role in addressing most 
of the security challenges and military crises vis-
à-vis nuclear-armed adversaries in North-east 
Asia until and unless they escalate to nuclear 
HTSܫNHY-T\J[JWJ[JSNKFHTSܫNHYNSYMJWJLNTSNX
э Japan, “National Security Strategy,” December 17, 

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conventional, it will never be free from the nuclear 
factor. Regional nuclear-armed adversaries may 
attempt to achieve their objectives in a gray 
zone situation i.e. “neither pure peacetime nor 
contingencies over territory, sovereignty and 
maritime economic interests”; or short of an 
FWRJI HTSܫNHY NSHQZINSL TUUTSJSYXѣ FYYJRUYX
of fait accompli or probing; or at other lower-end 
military contingencies by implicitly or explicitly 
brandishing their nuclear deterrent. They would 
also seek to offset Japanese-U.S. conventional 
superiority by threatening nuclear retaliation or 
J[JSRT[JYTIJJXHFQFYJFHTSܫNHYG^HTSIZHYNSL
limited nuclear attacks. Without adequate 
alternatives, U.S. extended nuclear deterrence 
guarantees will continue to be the means by which 
Japan is able to address potential nuclear threats.
Furthermore it is unfair for Tokyo to ask 
Washington to commit to deter and defend it 
from attacks by nuclear-armed adversaries with 
conventional forces alone. Limiting American 
military options would endanger Japan’s security 
and even suggesting such a restrained posture 
is likely to damage the Japan-U.S. alliance 
relationship, which is central to the credibility of 
extended deterrence.   
9MJ\F^KTW\FWI
Japan’s opposition to the ban treaty does not 
mean that it is downgrading its support for 
nuclear disarmament. This remains one of the 
crucial pillars of Japan’s foreign and security 
policy. Tokyo shares the frustration of treaty’s 
proponents of the paralysis of current nuclear 
disarmament mechanisms. It has proactively 
э Ministry of Defense of Japan, “National Defense 
5WTLWFR,ZNIJQNSJXKTW+>FSI'J^TSIѧ
)JHJRGJWU
э A situation of stability-instability paradox 
would affect negatively to a credibility of extended 
deterrence. See Robert Jervis, “Deterrence, Rogue 
States, and the U.S. Policy,” T. V. Paul, Patrick M. 
Morgan and James J. Wirtz, eds., Complex Deterrence: 
Strategy in the Global Age (Chicago: The University of 
(MNHFLT5WJXXU
pursued the revitalization of nuclear disarmament 
in various forums and opportunities including the 
review process for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), the Conference on Disarmament 
and the UN General Assembly. At the 2017 NPT 
Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), the then-
Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida announced that 
Japan would establish an eminent persons group 
that would consist of “men and women from 
both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states 
knowledgeable of nuclear disarmament” in order 
to “obtain proposals…that lead to a substantial 
progress of nuclear disarmament.”6  The group held 
NYXܪWXYRJJYNSLNS3T[JRGJWNS-NWTXMNRF
Its recommendations on nuclear disarmament 
and non-proliferation are to be submitted to the 
2018 NPT PrepCom.
In the same statement, Kishida also reiterated 
Japan’s position towards the legal prohibition of 
nuclear weapons:
[W]hen we reach a so-called 
“minimisation point” at which the 
number of nuclear weapons is 
decreased to a very low level, we will 
introduce a legal framework aimed 
at achieving and maintaining a world 
free of nuclear weapons, and then, we 
will reach this goal…I am convinced 
that this approach provides the 
realistic and practical shortcut 
towards a world free of nuclear 
weapons, instead of pressing a 
legally binding instrument to prohibit 
nuclear weapons at this point in 
a manner that deepens the gap 
between nuclear and non-nuclear-
weapon states. We should be well-
advised about the time sequences 
of addressing the legal framework 
eliminating nuclear weapons. 7
э “Statement by H.E. Mr. Fumio Kishida, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs,” General Debate, First Session of 
the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review 
Conference, May 2, 2017.
э ibid
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Japan believes that the ban treaty correctly 
highlights the ultimate goal of nuclear 
disarmament. However, Tokyo adheres to the 
notion that the treaty neither establishes a 
realistic process toward that end nor sets any 
practical measures to break the current nuclear 
disarmament impasse which to Japan’s mind, 
should be approached from both the humanitarian 
and national security viewpoints. Japan, together 
with other U.S. non-nuclear allies, has proposed 
following the so-called “progressive approach” 
which focuses on undertaking a series of parallel 
and simultaneous measures. These include, 
NSYJW FQNF NSHWJFXJI YWFSXUFWJSH^ HTSܪIJSHJ
building, and crisis management measures; 
further reduction of strategic and non-strategic 
nuclear weapons by the US and Russia, while 
other nuclear-armed states keep restraints on 
qualitative/quantitative build-up of respective 
nuclear arsenals; addressing Russia’s alleged 
violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear 
Forces (INF) Treaty; early entry into force of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); 
immediate commencement of negotiation toward 
the conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut-off 
9WJFY^ +2(9  FSI IJ[JQTURJSY TK [JWNܪHFYNTS
measures for nuclear weapons dismantlement. 
Resolving the security issues involving nuclear-
armed states and addressing the root-causes 
which are hindering progress on nuclear 
disarmament is essential.
At the same time, Tokyo recognizes that it is 
not easy to maintain the momentum for nuclear 
disarmament in the current security environment. 
In such circumstances, small and less ambiguous 
XYJUX\TZQIGJMJQUKZQ9MWJJXUJHNܪHUWTUTXFQX
could be considered. First, steps should be 
taken to prevent the gap between nuclear and 
non-nuclear-armed states and among non-
nuclear-armed states from widening. Japan 
could suggest for both treaty proponents and 
TUUTSJSYX YT OTNSYQ^ WJFKܪWR YMJNW HTRRNYRJSY
toward achieving the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons at the UN General Assembly, the NPT 
Review Conference and its PrepCom, or other 
appropriate international fora. The next step could 
be to resume discussions on how their respective 
approaches can co-exist and ultimately converge 
to break the current stalemate. The Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), 
which was initiated by Australia and Japan 
together with ten other non-nuclear-weapon 
states, both proponents and opponents of the 
TPNW, could be a useful platform to start those 
efforts. 
Second, Japan can continue consulting bilaterally 
with the United States not only on the ways to 
strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance, but also on 
how, to what extent, and under what circumstance 
they can actually rely less on extended nuclear 
deterrence.  Unless nuclear threats vis-à-vis Japan 
FWJXNLSNܪHFSYQ^WJIZHJIFSIJ[JSYZFQQ^WJRT[JI
US extended nuclear deterrence will remain the 
ultimate guarantor for Japan’s national security. 
Meanwhile, the alliance could contemplate 
ways reducing the role of nuclear deterrence 
whilst strengthening the reliability of the overall 
deterrence posture through, for instance, 
bolstering conventional counterforce capabilities 
as well as ballistic missile defenses. Tokyo and 
Washington have regular opportunities to talk 
frankly and intensively about nuclear deterrence 
and disarmament, including during the Japan-US 
Extended Deterrence Dialogue.
Third, amid the rapidly increasing tension in the 
Korean Peninsula and incrementally growing 
concerns of further nuclear proliferation in other 
regions, Japan should continue its efforts to 
promote thorough implementation of nuclear 
non-proliferation obligations by the international 
community, including proponents of the ban 
treaty, as an important component towards a 
world without nuclear weapons. For example, 
achieving universality of the Additional Protocol 
to the IAEA Safeguards Agreements is vital for 
preventing further nuclear proliferation while its 
accession is not an obligation under the NPT or 
the nuclear ban treaty. In addition, what is currently 
much more urgent is strict implementation of 
the UN Security Council Resolutions vis-à-vis the 
North Korean nuclear issue in order to change its 
behaviour on nuclear and missile activities.
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“... many non-nuclear 
NATO states are 
caught between their 
commitment to NATO 
and their domestic 
aspirations for nuclear 
disarmament.”
Emil Dall
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NATO has long opposed the idea of a nuclear ban 
treaty. It argues that it is an unwelcome distraction 
from achieving long-term gradual disarmament 
through existing accords such as the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and ignores the international 
security dynamics that necessitate the continued 
reliance on nuclear deterrence.
.SFSTKܪHNFQXYFYJRJSYWJQJFXJIXMTWYQ^FKYJWYMJ
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
(TPNW) opened for signature on 20 September 
2017, NATO asserted that the treaty not only 
“disregards the realities of the increasingly 
challenging international security environment” 
but risks undermining the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and “creating divisions 
FSIIN[JWLJSHJXFYFYNRJ\MJSFZSNܪJIFUUWTFHM
… is required more than ever”.2
Yet, NATO cannot ignore the treaty for two 
reasons. First, many non-nuclear NATO states 
are caught between their commitment to NATO 
and their domestic aspirations for nuclear 
disarmament. While these governments oppose 
the treaty on paper, it is important to acknowledge 
internal domestic debates, and the fact that 
many non-nuclear NATO states have interacted 
differently with the treaty over time. This might 
have implications for the wider Alliance, which will 
need to rethink how it will interact with the nuclear 
ban treaty in the longer term. 
э&UWJ[NTZX[JWXNTSTKYMNXHMFUYJW\FXUZGQNXMJI
in July 2017 on the ELN website. It can be accessed 
here: https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/
policy-brief/a-balancing-act/
э3&944KܪHNFQ<JGXNYJ3TWYM&YQFSYNH(TZSHNQ
Statement on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons, 2017 Available here: https://www.nato.int/
HUXJSSFYTMVSJ\XDMYR
A second and perhaps more urgent reason is the 
Alliance’s interaction with non-NATO states that 
are strong supporters of the treaty yet maintain 
close defence and security cooperation with 
NATO. Sweden is a case in point. The country is 
closely integrated with NATO and its operations 
yet has embarked on a comprehensive review to 
determine whether it can sign up to the nuclear 
ban treaty. Others, including Austria and Ireland, 
have been at the forefront of the nuclear ban 
movement. Therefore, NATO could soon face the 
reality of a nuclear ban treaty in its immediate 
neighbourhood.
&QQNSFQQYMJSZHQJFWGFSYWJFY^\NQQGJFINKܪHZQY
but necessary, process for the Alliance to engage 
with. NATO member states must collectively 
decide how to balance their engagement with the 
treaty with a continued commitment to nuclear 
deterrence, and work to reduce the perceived 
divisions that it believes the nuclear ban treaty 
has created.
9MJGFSYWJFY^FSI3&94TGQNLFYNTSX
NATO allies have very clear reasons for not 
being able to sign up to a nuclear ban treaty. 
Article 1(a) and (d) of the nuclear ban includes 
prohibitions on the development, production, 
testing, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. 
These provisions not only apply to NATO states 
possessing nuclear weapons, but also to their 
allies. In any circumstance where nuclear-
armed allies would plan to employ their nuclear 
weapons in defence of non-nuclear allies, the 
treaty would consider this unlawful. This would 
also constrain assurance or signalling missions 
carried out by nuclear-armed states on behalf 
of the wider Alliance. NATO states, by nature of 
their membership of an alliance where nuclear 
weapons form part of mutual defence, would 
therefore be in violation of the treaty. Article 1(e) 
further prohibits states to “assist, encourage 
A Balancing Act: NATO States and 
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or induce, in any way” any other state to carry 
out the aforementioned activities. Many ban 
proponents interpret the core prohibitions in the 
treaty as including any form of military planning 
that includes nuclear weapons. Any NATO state 
\TZQI ܪSI NY INKܪHZQY YT FWLZJ TYMJW\NXJ XMTZQI
they wish to sign up to the treaty.
An additional provision is directed at those non-
nuclear NATO states that host US nuclear weapons 
on their soil, which includes the Netherlands, 
Germany, Belgium, Italy and Turkey. Article 1(g) 
of the treaty prohibits “any stationing, installation 
or deployment of any nuclear weapons” in the 
territory of treaty signatories.
Therefore, as long as nuclear weapons remain 
central to NATO’s mission and defence, 
membership of the Alliance will be incompatible 
with the principles set out in the nuclear ban 
treaty.
Yet, NATO states have interacted with earlier 
processes that led to the ban treaty movement. The 
Humanitarian Initiative, the series of conferences 
GJY\JJS  FSI  XJY TZY YT J]FRNSJ YMJ
humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons 
use and to reframe disarmament discussions, 
enjoyed support from non-nuclear NATO states. 
 TK YMJ  STSSZHQJFW 3&94 XYFYJX FYYJSIJI
all three conferences, and all attended at least 
two. Although not indicative of support, even the 
United Kingdom and the United States attended 
YMJ .SNYNFYN[JѣXܪSFQHTSKJWJSHJ NS;NJSSF)ZWNSL
this time, non-nuclear NATO states also voted in 
support of resolutions in the UN First Committee 
referencing the Humanitarian Initiative.
Many however started to disengage from the 
initiative after it became clear that some states 
(including Austria and Ireland) were diverting the 
conversation away from a facts-based discussion 
over nuclear use and towards references to 
ban processes. During the second conference 
NS  WJKJWJSHJX \JWJ WJUJFYJIQ^ RFIJ YT
the successful processes that resulted in the 
э Montenegro became a full member of NATO in 
FSINXSTYNSHQZIJINSYMNXܪLZWJ
banning of landmines. The German delegation 
warned states that comparisons between 
nuclear weapons and landmines were not only 
unconvincing, they would also risk antagonizing 
important players central to disarmament 
discussions. Unsurprisingly, as conversations 
T[JWFSZHQJFWGFS NSYJSXNܪJI3&94XYFYJX YMFY
had previously felt comfortable taking part and 
supporting the processes, disengaged from the 
initiative.
)NKܪHZQY(TS[JWXFYNTSXў9MJ(FXJTK
3TW\F^FSIYMJ3JYMJWQFSIX
Despite their disengagement from the nuclear ban 
process, many non-nuclear NATO states remain 
frustrated over the lack of progress made by the 
nuclear weapons states on nuclear disarmament. 
&HFXJNSUTNSYNX3TW\F^\MNHMMTXYJIYMJܪWXY
-ZRFSNYFWNFS.SNYNFYN[JHTSKJWJSHJNS2FWHM
and has long been at the forefront of international 
peace and disarmament issues. In 2011, before 
the conference, the then-Labour foreign minister 
stated that a “real total prohibition” on nuclear 
weapons was desired, although it is unclear 
through which process this would be achieved. 
Two developments caused the Norwegians to 
back away from initial aspirations. First, as the 
facts-based discussion which the Norwegians 
XYFWYJINSGJLFSYTXMNKYYT\FWIXFUTQNYNHFQ
conversation around a nuclear ban, Norway had 
to reconsider its engagement with the initiative. 
э Government of Germany, Statement by Germany 
during the Second Conference on the Humanitarian 
.RUFHYTK3ZHQJFW<JFUTSX+JGWZFW^
in Nayarit/Mexico,  Available here: http://www.
FYTR\FKKJSKWJNIJܪQJFIRNSZXJWDZUQTFIUIKD
Dateien/German_Statement_Nayarit.pdf 
э Government of Norway, Innstilling fra utenriks- og 
forsvarskomiteen om globale sikkerhetsutfordringer i 
utenrikspolitikken. Terrorisme, organisert kriminalitet, 
piratvirksomhet og sikkerhetsutfordringer i det digitale 
rom, 2016, Available here: https://www.stortinget.no/
no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Innstillinger/
8YTWYNSLJYNSSX 
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Norway restated its commitment to nuclear 
disarmament as best achieved through a step-
by-step process that enjoys the engagement and 
support of nuclear weapon states. Second and 
supporting this reconsideration was the election of 
the Conservative party to government in October 
\MNHMJSFGQJIYMTXJ[TNHJXRTWJHWNYNHFQTK
FSZHQJFWGFSYTGJYMJRFOTWNY^[NJ\.SYMJ
Norwegian government explained in a statement 
at the UN that the original “humanitarian initiative 
has now been undermined” by efforts to achieve 
a nuclear ban treaty, which it perceived as “further 
polarization” of the international community.6 
After the 2016 UN vote which mandated the 
beginning of negotiations on a nuclear ban 
treaty, the Norwegian government explained 
that although it voted no, it fully understood and 
sympathised with the ban initiative, acknowledging 
that “progress on nuclear disarmament has been 
too slow ... because nuclear-weapon states have 
failed to engage wholeheartedly and with genuine 
determination”.7
Norway has had a long-standing domestic 
discussion on the value of deterrence vis-a-vis 
disarmament commitments, and discussions on 
the nuclear ban treaty and the role taken by Norway 
has continued to take place in the Norwegian 
Parliament. These voices represent a minority of 
Norwegian politics, albeit a vocal one. In May of 
this year, all parties apart from the government 
agreed that “there must be an international 
convention that stipulates the conditions for a 
world free of nuclear weapons” and recommended 
э3TW\F^1J]UQFSFYNTSTK[TYJMYYU
reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/
)NXFWRFRJSYKTWFHTRHTRJT[1D3TW\F^
pdf
э Explanation of Vote by Norway’s Special 
Representative for Disarmament Mr. Knut Langeland, 
Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament 
negotiations, 27 October 2016 Available here: 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/
)NXFWRFRJSYKTWFHTRHTRJT[1D3TW\F^
pdf 
that the government take an active role in this.8 
.S 3T[JRGJW  F 1FGTZW UFWY^ UTQNYNHNFS
referred to the government’s decision to vote no 
to starting ban treaty negotiations as “a breach 
of Norway’s leadership role” in the work to ban 
nuclear weapons.9 In addition, the Government 
Pension Fund of Norway, the sovereign wealth 
fund derived from the country’s oil revenues, 
has long maintained a policy to not invest in 
companies involved in the production of nuclear 
weapons, including BAE Systems, Boeing and 
Lockheed Martin.10 Finally, while not indicative 
of Norwegian politics as a whole, the Norwegian 
Nobel Committee’s decision to award the Nobel 
Peace Prize to the International Campaign to 
Abolish Nuclear Weapons, a leading civil society 
force behind the nuclear ban treaty, will only add to 
this ongoing national debate on nuclear weapons.
Another example of where domestic politics have 
played a role in determining interaction with the 
nuclear ban treaty is the Netherlands. The Dutch 
government was the only NATO state present 
FY YMJ ܪSFQ WTZSI TK YWJFY^ SJLTYNFYNTSX FKYJW
a vote in the Dutch parliament mandated the 
government to attend. The Dutch representative at 
the negotiations, Lise Gregoire, stated that whilst 
her delegation appreciated the “broad momentum 
for disarmament” the ban treaty has created 
э Government of Norway, Innstilling til Stortinget fra 
utenriks- og forsvarskomiteen Available here: https://
www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/innstillinger/
XYTWYNSLJYNSSXUIK
э Government of Norway, tortinget - Møte 
TSXIFLIJSST[JRGJWPQ&[FNQFGQJ
here: https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-
og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Referater/
8YTWYNSLJYTWINSFWXUTWWJYNRJ
э Norges Bank, OBSERVASJON OG UTELUKKELSE 
AV SELSKAPER, Norges Bank beslutter om selskaper 
skal utelukkes fra fondets investeringsunivers 
eller settes på en observasjonsliste. Available 
here:  https://www.nbim.no/no/ansvarlighet/
utelukkelse-av-selskaper/
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it was “incompatible with NATO obligations”.11 
By attending, the government appears to have 
quelled any immediate domestic momentum 
towards supporting the ban. 
However, the engagement with the ban treaty 
should be considered within the wider context 
of the stationing of US nuclear weapons in the 
Netherlands. Former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud 
1ZGGJWX KFRTZXQ^ HTSܪWRJI YMJNW UWJXJSHJ NS F
 NSYJW[NJ\ WJKJWWNSL YT YMJR FX ѦFGXTQZYJQ^
pointless”.12 4YMJW KTWRJW LT[JWSRJSY TKܪHNFQX
including a former defence minister, have 
expressed support for their withdrawal. The 
domestic debate around nuclear weapons remains 
largely on the fringes of political conversations. 
However, even if the nuclear ban treaty fades from 
public conversation, a debate over the basing of 
forward-deployed US nuclear weapons on Dutch 
territory could take its place. In fact, a decision 
to withdraw nuclear weapons could successfully 
steer attention away from the nuclear ban treaty 
and satisfy domestic commitments to nuclear 
disarmament, even as the country continues to 
enjoy protection under NATO’s extended nuclear 
umbrella. 
The Dutch and the Norwegians are not being 
held back by their NATO obligations alone: NATO 
states believe in the continued value of nuclear 
deterrence and the security it provides. However, 
countries like Norway and the Netherlands, which 
э4KܪHNFQ<JGXNYJTKYMJ,T[JWSRJSYTKYMJ
Kingdom of the Netherlands, available here: https://
permanentpresentations.nl/latest/news/07/07/
explanation-of-vote-of-ambassador-lise-gregoire-on-
the-draft-text-of-the-nuclear-ban-treaty 
э BBC News, US nuclear bombs ‘based in 
3JYMJWQFSIXѣJ])ZYHM521ZGGJWX/ZSJ
Available here: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
\TWQIJZWTUJ 
э Federation of American Scientists, B61-12 
Nuclear Bomb Triggers Debate in the Netherlands, 
8JUYJRGJW&[FNQFGQJMJWJhttps://fas.org/blogs/
XJHZWNY^GMTQQFSI 
are unable or unwilling to endorse a ban treaty at 
YMNX UTNSY HTZQI KFHJ INKܪHZQY ITRJXYNH IJGFYJX
after a nuclear ban treaty enters into force. Norway 
and the Netherlands, along with fellow non-nuclear 
NATO states, have already provided leadership in 
other disarmament fora, including disarmament 
[JWNܪHFYNTS\TWPFSIYWJFYNJXYMFYKTWRUFWYTKF
step-by-step approach to disarmament. Pressure 
from the nuclear ban treaty could be diverted to 
achieve more in these processes. As domestic 
criticism will not go away these governments 
will have to ensure that nuclear deterrence, a 
core component of NATO’s defence posture, is 
partnered with continued progress on multilateral 
disarmament to manage this. 
'FS9WJFY^3JNLMGTZWXў9MJ(FXJTK
8\JIJS
Crucial also is the interaction with non-NATO 
states which are strong supporters of the ban 
treaty. Austria, Ireland, Switzerland, Sweden and 
1NJHMYJSXYJNS FQQ XZUUTWYJI YMJ ܪSFQ YWJFY^ YJ]Y
and their accession to the treaty may be imminent. 
Some of these countries work closely with NATO 
states on non-proliferation and disarmament 
issues in and outside of the NPT process, and have 
issued joint statements under the EU banner. 
Sweden has been a strong supporter of the 
nuclear ban treaty process, voted for the 
FITUYNTS TK YMJ ܪSFQ YWJFY^ YJ]Y JFWQNJW YMNX ^JFW
and has now announced the start of an inquiry 
to determine whether it can fully accede to the 
ܪSNXMJISZHQJFWGFSYWJFY^<MNQJ+TWJNLS2NSNXYJW
Margot Wallström has stated that she believes all 
of Sweden’s defence and security cooperation 
HTRRNYRJSYX\NYM3&94HFSXYNQQGJKZQܪQQJIFKYJW
signing the ban treaty, clearly this aspect will form 
a crucial part of the inquiry.
Sweden is part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
programme, and has been described by the 
Alliance as one of its “most active partners and 
э See Michal Smetana (2016), Stuck on 
INXFWRFRJSYYMJ*ZWTUJFS:SNTSFSIYMJ359
7J[NJ\(TSKJWJSHJ.SYJWSFYNTSFQ&KKFNWX
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a valued contributor to NATO-led operations”. 
Sweden’s integration includes regularly taking 
part in NATO exercises as well as inviting NATO 
neighbours to join Swedish military exercises. 
The recent Aurora 17 exercise held in September 
enjoyed the participation of several NATO partners 
including Denmark, Estonia, France, Lithuania, 
Norway and the US.16 
In addition to exercises, Sweden’s military assets 
are designed or manufactured in close cooperation 
with or by NATO neighbours with a view to 
achieving interoperable platforms. US Secretary 
of Defense James Mattis reportedly warned the 
Swedish government that membership of the 
nuclear ban treaty would not only have an impact 
on these joint defence industrial programmes but 
also the country’s wider relations with the Alliance 
and any possibility of Sweden ever becoming a 
full NATO member.17 
)JXUNYJ YMJ UTYJSYNFQ INKܪHZQYNJX NS HTSYNSZNSL
cooperation after signing a ban treaty, Sweden 
HFS WJFXTSFGQ^ FWLZJ YMFY 3&94ѣX &WYNHQJ 
commitment whereby the Alliance would defend 
Allies under attack, with options including nuclear 
weapons, is the only part of NATO cooperation 
equivalent to “assist, encourage or induce” nuclear 
deterrence. If it does so, Sweden could “set a 
precedent for how Article 1(e) will be interpreted 
by signatories, and potentially tip the scales for 
[other] countries” wishing to sign up to the ban.18
э3&944KܪHNFQ<JGXNYJ7JQFYNTSX\NYM8\JIJS
Available here:  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
YTUNHXDMYR
э Available here: http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/
en/activities/exercises/aurora-17/ 
э Defense News, Mattis reportedly threatens 
Swedish defense cooperation over nuclear treaty, 
September 2017, Available here: https://www.
defensenews.com/global/europe/2017/09/01/mattis-
reportedly-threatens-swedish-defense-cooperation-
over-nuclear-treaty/ 
э Available here: https://rusi.org/commentary/
X\JIJS
*

XHMTNHJSFYTTWSZHQJFWGFS
NATO will have to decide what a close military 
partnership with countries that sign the nuclear 
ban treaty looks like in practice. While NATO 
\NQQ GJSJܪY KWTR XZXYFNSNSL XZHM WJQFYNTSXMNUX
for common defence purposes alone, value will 
also be derived more generally from continuing 
close engagement with ban signatories. For 
example, cooperating on disarmament initiatives 
will not only demonstrate that the Alliance is still 
committed to nuclear disarmament, but will also 
contribute towards reducing the divisions that 
NATO is concerned the nuclear ban treaty has 
created. 
However, at the same time the Alliance may 
also wish to draw a line at certain elements of 
cooperation, so as not to motivate any of its own 
members to accede to the ban treaty. An urgent 
priority for the Alliance should therefore be to 
decide how it can have a productive engagement 
with a treaty it does not agree with, yet should not 
alienate.
3&94JSLFLJRJSY\NYMYMJGFSYWJFY^
With the ban now a reality, NATO Allies will have to 
factor the treaty into their conversation both with 
domestic audiences, and with states supporting 
the ban treaty, for whom the treaty is a victory and 
the culmination of decades of campaigning for a 
world free of nuclear weapons.
9MNX RFPJX YMJ SZHQJFW GFS YWJFY^ F INKܪHZQY
balancing act for NATO states. So far, nuclear 
deterrence has been at the heart of NATO’s 
mission. Nuclear disarmament, while important, 
has been considered a priority only in the context 
of a favourable security environment. However if 
no progress is seen to be made towards a world 
free of nuclear weapons, domestic pressures 
could tip the scales in favour of disarmament 
concerns.
NATO should also urgently decide how it wishes 
to engage with the nuclear ban treaty as the 
treaty enters into force in countries around the 
world. If the Alliance is concerned that the nuclear 
ban treaty causes divisions amongst states, 
now is the time to work towards reducing those 
divisions. That is best done through constructive 
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“The purpose of the 
treat y is to challenge 
and destabilise the 
acceptability of nuclear 
violence, to create a 
‘crisis of legitimacy’ for 
nuclear weapons and 
nuclear deterrence”
Nick Ritchie
DR NICK RITCHIE 45
Dr Nick Ritchie
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
(TPNW) was negotiated to change the global 
political, legal, and normative context of nuclear 
weapons. The aim is to delegitimise nuclear 
weapons in the expectation that this will, over 
time, help foster an environment in which nuclear 
weapons can be eliminated as unacceptable 
instruments of statecraft.
Supporters of the humanitarian initiative and the 
TPNW do not claim the new treaty will ‘magically’ 
cause nuclear disarmament. They recognise that 
it must be complemented by many more steps 
and agreements, such as those outlined in the 
‘Action Plan’ agreed at the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference. TPNW supporters do, however, argue 
that the global legal-normative context of nuclear 
weapons matters and that changing this context 
in support of nuclear disarmament is an essential 
process for enabling that disarmament to happen. 
The treaty’s supporters point out that a universal 
prohibition has often preceded the elimination of 
other unacceptable weapons, such as chemical 
weapons.1
)JQJLNYNRNXNSLSZHQJFW\JFUTSX
The post-Cold War nuclear disarmament process 
MFX QFWLJQ^ HJSYWJI TS YMJ ܪ[J 359 SZHQJFW
weapon states and their efforts to reduce the value 
of nuclear weapons in terms of nuclear weapon 
numbers, types, and doctrine.2 But this approach 
э Beatrice Fihn, “The Logic of Banning Nuclear 
<JFUTSXѧ8ZW[N[FQ
э Nick Ritchie, “Valuing and Devaluing Nuclear 
<JFUTSXѧ(TSYJRUTWFW^8JHZWNY^5TQNH^
UUў
does a number of things that underpin widespread 
frustration with the slow pace of disarmament 
among non-nuclear weapon states. First, whilst 
it accepts that the risk of nuclear violence must 
be taken seriously, the problem is framed not so 
much as the weapons themselves or the practice 
of nuclear deterrence, but who has them, in what 
SZRGJWX FSI MT\ YMJ^ FWJ HTSܪLZWJI 8JHTSI
it suggests the risk of nuclear violence can 
be safely managed for the foreseeable future 
through adjustments to nuclear posture, doctrine, 
consolidation of nuclear forces, and vigorous 
counter-proliferation. Third, it devolves agency 
for nuclear disarmament to the nuclear-armed 
states and their agendas and relationships. 
Finally, it leaves the logic and practice of nuclear 
deterrence undisturbed and leaves the legitimacy 
of nuclear weapons intact as far as the nuclear-
armed states and their allies are concerned. 
We see this, for example, when nuclear weapon 
reductions are accompanied by statements that 
restate an unequivocal commitment to nuclear 
deterrence and the necessity of nuclear weapons 
for national security.
In contrast to this approach, a group of states 
responded with a new initiative to refocus 
disarmament diplomacy on the unacceptable 
humanitarian consequences of nuclear violence 
in the run up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. 
They sought to actively reframe nuclear weapons 
as unacceptable and illegitimate irrespective 
of the perceived utility of the weapons by those 
that possess them (or indeed are ‘possessed’ 
by them). This was based on an understanding 
э I explore this further in “Legitimising and 
Delegitimising Nuclear Weapons”, in Borrie, J. and 
Caughley, T. Viewing Nuclear Weapons Through 
F-ZRFSNYFWNFS1JSX,JSJ[F:3.).74S
reframing see John Borrie, “Humanitarian reframing 
The Treaty on the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons: delegitimising 
unacceptable weapons
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that states are unlikely to relinquish nuclear 
weapons if they assign a high value to them 
and deem it legitimate to do so. Delegitimising 
nuclear weapons is therefore about challenging 
the international social acceptability of valuing 
nuclear weapons under any circumstances. It is 
a process of widening and deepening a collective 
normative censure of nuclear violence and 
diminishing nuclear weapons as a ‘currency of 
power’ in global politics. 
The key difference with the post-Cold War 
approach dominated by the nuclear weapon 
states is that the problem is explicitly the weapon 
WFYMJW YMFSXUJHNܪHSZHQJFWUWFHYNHJXTWXUJHNܪH
nuclear actors. The threat to peace and security 
is not nuclear proliferation (which is a term that 
HTSܪSJX IFSLJW YT YMJ FHVZNXNYNTS TK SZHQJFW
weapons by additional states), the threat is the 
existence of the weapons themselves irrespective 
of who has them. Nuclear weapons become a 
collective international liability rather than an 
individual national asset. 
Emphasising the delegitimation of nuclear 
weapons has also shifted disarmament diplomacy 
away from an exclusive focus on trying to change 
the policies of the nuclear-armed states and 
towards changing the normative international 
environment in which nuclear weapons and 
nuclear-armed states are embedded. In doing so, 
it has empowered a much broader community of 
states in disarmament diplomacy to change the 
international social structure of nuclear legitimacy 
and illegitimacy, and the relationship between 
nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states. 
This was cemented in the Austrian government’s 
UQJILJ NS  YT ѦXYNLRFYNXJ UWTMNGNY FSI
eliminate nuclear weapons in light of their 
unacceptable humanitarian consequences and 
of nuclear weapons and the logic of a ban”, 
.SYJWSFYNTSFQ&KKFNWXUUITN

э Anne Harrington, “Nuclear Weapons as the 
Currency of Power: Deconstructing the Fetishism of 
+TWHJѧ9MJ3TSUWTQNKJWFYNTS7J[NJ\
associated risks” that was subsequently adopted 
as a UN General Assembly resolution. This 
unacceptability is rooted in a collective moral 
revulsion and rejection of particular categories 
of violence, especially massive, inhumane and 
indiscriminate forms of violence.6 This has 
GJJS UWTLWJXXN[JQ^ HTINܪJI NS QJLFQ WZQJX FSI
normative principles governing the conduct of 
war, in particular international humanitarian law 
FUUQNHFGQJNSFWRJIHTSܫNHYGZYFQXTNSYJWSFYNTSFQ
human rights law and international environmental 
law.7 According to these norms and rules, and by 
focusing on what nuclear weapons are rather than 
what purpose they are meant to serve, nuclear 
weapons are the worst of all.8 This concern with 
the effects of nuclear detonations is not a new 
phenomenon but it has taken on new salience as 
nuclear disarmament processes have slowed and 
concern at the permanence of nuclear weapons 
has increased. 
9MJJKKJHYTKFUWTMNGNYNTSYWJFY^
Advocates of a ‘step-by-step’ or ‘building blocks’9 
э United Nations General Assembly, “Humanitarian 
Pledge for the Prohibition and Elimination of Nuclear 
<JFUTSXѧ&7*8)JHJRGJW
э See Ethan Nadelman, “Global Prohibition Regimes: 
The Evolution of Norms in International Society”, 
.SYJWSFYNTSFQ4WLFSN_FYNTSUU
э For an overview see Randy Rydell, “The United 
Nations and a Humanitarian Approach to Nuclear 
Disarmament” in Nuclear Abolition Forum, No. 1, 
October 2011.
э See “Working Towards the Elimination of 
Nuclear Weapons”, Draft Resolution and Background 
)THZRJSY()(TZSHNQTK)JQJLFYJXTKYMJ
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 
Geneva, 26 September 2011, p. 10.
э “A progressive approach to a world free of nuclear 
weapons: revisiting the building-blocks paradigm”, 
working paper submitted by 18 US allies to the 2016 
Open-Ended Working Group on Taking Forward 
Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament, AC.286/WP.9, 
,JSJ[F+JGWZFW^
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approach to nuclear disarmament argued that a 
TPNW was an unnecessary distraction from other 
important measures such as a Fissile Material 
(Cut-off) Treaty, a diplomatic insurgency that 
would imperil the NPT, or a deliberately divisive, 
exclusive and therefore invalid diplomatic 
process.10 A number of commentators also 
criticised the treaty as ineffective after it was 
ܪSFQNXJI8HTYY8FLFSFSI'JSOFRNS;FQJSYNSTKTW
example, castigated the treaty as a “divisive and 
ultimately ineffective ban”.11 
These concerns have been addressed elsewhere,12 
but a number of points can be made here. First, 
the prohibition and other important disarmament 
measures such as entry into force of the CTBT, 
negotiation of an FMCT, nuclear stockpile 
WJIZHYNTSX INXFWRFRJSY [JWNܪHFYNTS WJXJFWHM
and other ‘building blocks’ are not mutually 
exclusive. Political work is required on both 
UM^XNHFQHTSXYWFNSYXTSXYTHPUNQJXYJXYNSLܪXXNQJ
material production, deployments) and normative 
and legal constraints (on declaratory policy, use, 
possession). Focussing on delegitimising nuclear 
weapons does not diminish the importance of 
such steps, but neither does it restrict “effective 
measures” on nuclear disarmament under the 
NPT’s Article VI to the agency of those that 
have nuclear weapons. Delegitimising nuclear 
э For example, Australian Foreign Minister Julie 
Bishop, “We Must Engage, not Enrage Nuclear 
(TZSYWNJXѧ8^ISJ^2TWSNSL-JWFQI+JGWZFW^
э Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino, “The 
nuclear weapons ban treaty: Opportunities lost”, 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 16 July 2017. 
Available at <http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-weapons-
GFSYWJFY^TUUTWYZSNYNJXQTXY#2^WJXUTSXJ
is available at <http://thebulletin.org/commentary/
WJGZYYFQHWNYNHXSZHQJFW\JFUTSGFSYWJFY^#
э See the detailed discussion in John Borrie, 
Tim Caughley, Torbjørn Hugo Graff, Magnus Lovøld, 
Gru Nystuen, and Camilla Waszink, A Prohibition on 
Nuclear Weapons: A Guide to the Issues (Geneva: 
UNIDIR and ILPI, February 2016).
э See Working Paper on “Article VI of the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” submitted 
weapons through the TPNW certainly changes the 
context of future ‘steps’, indeed that is the point, 
but it is not incompatible with them. 
Claims that the prohibition treaty is a threat to 
the NPT tend to mask a deeper opposition to the 
delegitimation of nuclear weapons because those 
weapons and the practice of nuclear deterrence 
are still accepted as legitimate. It is resistance 
to a process of delegitimation that appears to 
have led nuclear-armed states to largely exclude 
themselves from the humanitarian impact of 
SZHQJFW\JFUTSXHTSKJWJSHJXYMJFSI
Open-Ended Working Groups, and the negotiating 
sessions of the TPNW. Moreover, claims that 
the treaty is divisive miss the point that it is a 
symptom of deep and growing division within the 
NPT, not a cause of it. 
Arguments that the TPNW will be ineffective 
FWJ FQXT ZS\FWWFSYJI FSI WJܫJHY F QNRNYJI
understanding of the treaty’s purpose and the 
humanitarian initiative. It is well understood that 
the effect of the treaty will be indirect and long-
term. The treaty’s supporters do not claim it to be 
a disarmament panacea. They understand that 
they are working against powerful vested interests 
in nuclear weapons, and that they are a relatively 
disempowered non-nuclear many compared to 
the far more powerful nuclear few. It remains 
to be seen whether the treaty’s supporters can 
translate its norms into wider political effects 
by the New Agenda Coalition to the Preparatory 
(TSKJWJSHJKTW3597J[NJ\(TSKJWJSHJ359
(43+5(...<5&UWNQ FSI9NR
Caughley, “Analysing Effective Measures: Options for 
Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Implementation 
of NPT Article VI”, ILPI-UNIDIR NPT Review Conference 
8JWNJX5FUJW3T+JGWZFW^
э See “The ‘Legal Gap’: Recommendations to the 
Open-ended Working Group on taking forward nuclear 
disarmament negotiations”, working paper submitted 
XNLSFYTWNJXTKYMJѢ&ZXYWNFS5QJILJѣYTYMJ
Open-Ended Working Group on Taking Forward 
2ZQYNQFYJWFQ3ZHQJFW)NXFWRFRJSY&(<5
,JSJ[F2F^
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that are consistent with the treaty, but it cannot 
be claimed in advance that the treaty will be 
ineffective. 
History shows that states that initially resist an 
international norm can be socialised into the new 
legal-normative order over time – termination 
of the slave trade and colonialism being the two 
most important examples. Experience also shows 
that international norms can affect the behaviour 
of states that do not join the associated regimes, 
such as the ban on anti-personnel land mines, and 
that norms developed without the major powers 
can be effective. As Costa Rica and Malaysia 
argued in a 2016 working paper: “the experience 
with biological weapons and anti-personnel 
landmines suggests that even a treaty with 
limited membership and little content beyond 
a straightforward prohibition could be highly 
effective in developing and strengthening norms 
against nuclear weapons. The fact that some 
nuclear-armed states explicitly oppose such a 
treaty is further evidence of its likely effectiveness 
as a means of norm-building.”16
Perhaps more importantly, though, is the question 
ѢNK STY YMNX YWJFY^ ST\ YMJS \MFY$ѣ (WNYNHX NRUQ^
that the alternatives for the treaty’s supporters 
primarily from the global South are to quietly 
accept a permanently nuclear-armed world and the 
dangers of catastrophic harm that go with it, or to 
advocate only those changes in nuclear practices 
that leave the logic of deterrence undisturbed 
and the legitimacy of nuclear violence intact. 
Or perhaps they should just trust the nuclear-
armed to manage their arsenals ‘responsibly’ in 
perpetuity. The implication is that the 122 states 
э Adam Bower, “Norms Without the Great Powers: 
International Law, Nested Social Structures, and the 
Ban on Antipersonnel Mines”, International Studies 
6ZFWYJWQ^UUў
э “Developing and strengthening norms for 
attaining and maintaining a world without nuclear 
weapons” submitted by Costa Rica and Malaysia 
to the 2016 UN Open Ended Working Group on 
Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament 
3JLTYNFYNTSX,JSJ[F&&(<5U
that voted in favour of the treaty at the UN in July 
2017 are not allowed to exercise their collective 
will through the UN to try and shift the context and 
IJGFYJTSXZHMFINKܪHZQY YWFSXSFYNTSFQUWTGQJR
that affects them just as much as it affects the 
nuclear-armed. The compelling evidence of the 
disastrous global climatic effects of a ‘limited’ 
nuclear war that would put over a billion people 
at risk of starvation and threaten the collapse of 
global food suppliesYJXYNܪJXYTYMFY.17
9MJGWTFIJWHTSYJ]Y
This leads us to the broader context of the 
TPNW that cannot be ignored. The transnational 
advocacy network of states, inter-governmental 
organisations, and civil society organisations 
propelling the humanitarian initiative has 
articulated a different view of national and global 
security.18 It has challenged the state-centric, 
militarised and patriarchal security paradigm that 
generates and legitimises the doctrine of nuclear 
deterrence. Instead, it has privileged collective 
ideas of security rooted in justice, anti-colonialism, 
development, human rights, and environmental 
stewardship. 19 It has connected nuclear power 
structures, inequalities, and violence with a wider 
э See, for example, International Physicians for 
the Prevention of Nuclear War, Zero is the Only Option: 
Four Medical and Environmental Cases for Eradicating 
Nuclear Weapons, 2011; Ira Helfand, Nuclear Famine: 
A Billion People at Risk, International Physicians for 
the Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for 
Social Responsibility, 2012; Owen Toon, Alan Robock 
and Richard Turco, “Environmental Consequences 
of Nuclear War”, Physics Today, December 2008, pp. 
 2FYY2NQQX4\JS9TTS7NHMFWI9ZWHT)TZLQFX
Kinnison and Rolando Garcia, “Massive Global Ozone 
1TXX5WJINHYJI+TQQT\NSL7JLNTSFQ3ZHQJFW(TSܫNHYѧ
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
э See Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 
“Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and 
Regional Politics”, International Social Science Journal 
UU
э See “Nuclear disarmament in context – a global 
governance issue”, working paper submitted Ireland 
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set of global structural hierarchies, inequalities, 
and violent practices and should be understood 
in this wider context. It is no coincidence that 
the humanitarian initiative and TPNW have been 
championed by states of the ‘global South’ in 
Africa, Asia and South America. The views of 
many of these states on global nuclear politics 
and disarmament is informed by a post-colonial 
worldview in which ideas of ‘nuclear justice’ are 
central.20 This has been articulated by the Non-
Aligned Movement since the 1960s but largely 
ignored in Western nuclear discourse.21 
The humanitarian initiative and the ban treaty 
have challenged the existence of nuclear 
weapons and the practice of nuclear deterrence 
in terms of international humanitarian law, but 
they have also challenged nuclear deterrence 
as a symptom of a security paradigm that is 
IJJUQ^ܫF\JI .SITNSLXT YMJ NSNYNFYN[JMFXSTY
only reframed nuclear weapons as illegitimate 
and disarmament as a humanitarian imperative, 
but embedded nuclear disarmament in wider 
discourses of collective transnational security. 
The ‘realist’ security paradigm that legitimatises 
nuclear deterrence is seen as woefully inadequate 
in the face of transnational global challenges. 
In particular, it offers little in response to the 
HFYFXYWTUMNHJHTQTLNHFQHWNXJXYMFY\NQQIJܪSJYMJ
21st century and our conceptions and experiences 
to the 2016 Open-Ended Working Group on Taking 
Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament, AC.286/
<5,JSJ[F2F^8JJFQXT/TMS'TWWNJ
and Tim Caughley, An Illusion of Safety: Challenges 
of Nuclear Weapon Detonations for United Nations 
Humanitarian Coordination and Response (Geneva: 
:3.).7
э See Shampa Biswas, Nuclear Desire: Power 
and the Postcolonial Nuclear Order (Minneapolis: 
:SN[JWXNY^TK2NSSJXTYF5WJXXFSI-FWFQI
Muller, “Between power and justice: current problems 
and perspectives of the NPT regime”, Strategic 
&SFQ^XNXUU
э Dan Plesch, “The South and disarmament at the 
:3ѧ9MNWI<TWQI6ZFWYJWQ^UU
ITN
of security.22 Nuclear weapons are understood 
through this lens as harbingers of extreme 
violence and environmental disaster whose non-
use cannot be assured, yet simply must be and 
can only be through their elimination. As John 
Carlson, formerly of the Australian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the IAEA, put it, “A treaty which 
reinforces the stigmatization of nuclear weapons 
and establishes a framework for further steps 
towards disarmament seems an excellent place 
to start.” 
(TSHQZXNTS
To conclude, the humanitarian initiative was 
born out of exasperation with the slow pace of 
nuclear disarmament, the continuing dangers of a 
nuclear-armed world, and a seemingly implacable 
commitment to the logic of nuclear deterrence 
by the nuclear-armed. Its core theme of 
delegitimising and stigmatising nuclear weapons 
coalesced around the idea of a nuclear weapons 
prohibition treaty. The purpose of the treaty is 
to challenge and destabilise the acceptability of 
nuclear violence, to create a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ 
for nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, and 
thereby precipitate change in the nuclear policies 
and practices of the nuclear-armed and their 
nuclear supporters, change that otherwise did 
not seem forthcoming. Whether that change is 
possible remains to be seen but, as Sir Michael 
Quinlan argued in 2009, we cannot live with a 
system of security based on “the threat of colossal 
disaster” for the rest of human history.
э See Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything: 
Capitalism vs. The Climate (New York: Simon and 
8HMZXYJWFSI&SYMTS^'ZWPJ&ZIWF2NYHMJQQ
Simon Dalby, Stephanie Fishel and Daniel Levine, 
“Planet Politics: A Manifesto from the End of IR”, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies
э/TMS(FWQXTSѦ&SZHQJFW\JFUTSXGFSўܪSINSL
HTRRTSLWTZSIѧ&XNF5FHNܪH1JFIJWXMNU3JY\TWPKTW
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Policy 
'WNJK3U+JGWZFW^U
э Christian Reus-Smit, “International Crises of 
1JLNYNRFH^ѧ.SYJWSFYNTSFQ5TQNYNHX
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“The oxygen feeding 
the nuclear ban treaty 
is the stalemate in 
traditional arms control 
and disarmament and 
the defence of extended 
deterrence should be 
combined with efforts 
to move this process 
along.”
Matthew Harries
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Dr Matthew Harries1
Extended nuclear deterrence is fundamental 
to the design of the existing non-proliferation 
architecture. The non-nuclear-armed members 
of NATO, Japan, South Korea and Australia are all 
non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in good standing 
with their non-proliferation obligations.2 Nothing 
in the NPT forbids either extended nuclear 
deterrence or NATO nuclear sharing. In fact, 
э The author would like to thank Heather Williams, 
Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Andrea Berger, Beatrice Fihn 
and Brad Roberts for providing helpful comments on 
the theme of this chapter.
э This chapter limits itself to considering those 
states covered by extended nuclear deterrence 
guarantees from the United States, and does not 
assess the implications for Russian extended 
deterrence to the members of the Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation (CSTO).
э Quite the opposite: in the mid-1960s, serious 
negotiations on the NPT could only begin once the 
United States and Soviet Union had hammered out 
an agreement on non-proliferation provisions (NPT 
Articles I and II) that left NATO nuclear sharing intact 
while killing off plans for a future multilateral NATO 
nuclear force. See William Alberque, ‘The NPT and the 
Origins of NATO’s Nuclear Sharing’, IFRI Proliferation 
Paper, February 2017, https://www.ifri.org/sites/
IJKFZQYܪQJXFYTRXܪQJXFQGJWVZJDSUYDTWNLNSXDSFYTD
nuclear_2017.pdf; Hal Brands, ‘Non-Proliferation 
and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The 
Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT’, Cold War History, 
[TQST ,JTWLJ'ZSS&WRX(TSYWTQG^
Committee: Managing Negotiations With the Russians 
extended nuclear deterrence guarantees played a 
crucial role in persuading several American allies 
to join the NPT and remain non-nuclear. Although 
they have different perspectives, countries under 
the United States’ nuclear umbrella have tended 
to adopt a moderate stance, supportive of 
disarmament efforts but falling well short of the 
uncompromising advocacy of the non-aligned 
movement. The ban treaty marks an attempt to 
end this balancing act.
The ban treaty goes much further than simply 
prohibiting nuclear weapons themselves: it 
targets deterrence, not just possession or use; 
it explicitly prohibits nuclear sharing; and it 
implicitly prohibits a state party from receiving 
any kind of nuclear deterrence guarantee. It 
therefore forces umbrella states to pick a side on 
an issue that they would prefer stayed under the 
radar. This might actually consolidate, rather than 
undermine, their support for nuclear deterrence. 
Yet rejecting the ban treaty outright is politically 
uncomfortable for many umbrella states, for a 
variety of reasons, including a general desire to 
conform to international norms, the opacity and 
8YFSKTWI:SN[JWXNY^5WJXXHMFUYJW FSI
Matthew Harries, ‘The Role of Article VI in Debates 
about the Non-Proliferation Treaty’, PhD thesis, King’s 
(TQQJLJ1TSITSHMFUYJWXFSI
э For example, Australia, Canada, Germany, 
Japan, Poland and Turkey are members of the Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, a ministerial-
level group formed in 2010 with the intention of 
bridging NPT divisions.
э8JJ-JFYMJW<NQQNFRXѢ)TJXYMJܪLMYT[JWF
SZHQJFW\JFUTSXGFSYMWJFYJSLQTGFQXYFGNQNY^$ѣ
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9 February 2017, 
MYYUYMJGZQQJYNSTWLITJXܪLMYT[JWSZHQJFW\JFUTSX
GFSYMWJFYJSLQTGFQXYFGNQNY^
The ban treaty and the future of 
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sensitivity surrounding nuclear weapons, and the 
fact that these are democratic states and thus 
responsive (albeit to varying degrees) to public 
pressure.6 
9WJFY^FSFQ^XNX
The text of the ban treaty clearly targets the 
concept and practice of extended nuclear 
deterrence. Four aspects of the treaty are of 
UFWYNHZQFWXNLSNܪHFSHJ
Preambular language rejecting nuclear use under 
any circumstances
Although not operative language, the preamble 
demonstrates the treaty’s guiding intent. ‘Any use’ 
of nuclear weapons is held to have ‘catastrophic 
humanitarian consequences’; to be ‘abhorrent 
to the principles of humanity and the dictates of 
public conscience’; and to be ‘contrary to … the 
principles and rules of international humanitarian 
law’. This leaves no room for nuclear deterrence—
including extended nuclear deterrence—because 
it rules out even retaliatory use, no matter how 
dire the circumstances. It also goes beyond the 
1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory 
opinion, which was not able to conclude whether 
nuclear use would be lawful in an extreme 
circumstance of self-defence.7 
э I have argued elsewhere that the ban treaty’s 
disproportionate impact on democratic states is a 
shortcoming; one supporter of the ban responded that 
this is simply a side-effect of a normative prohibition. 
See Matthew Harries, ‘The real problem with a nuclear 
ban treaty’, Carnegie Endowment for International 
5JFHJ2FWHMMYYUHFWSJLNJJSIT\RJSY
TWLWJFQUWTGQJR\NYMSZHQJFWGFSYWJFY^
pub-68286; and Nick Ritchie, ‘The real “problem” with 
FSZHQJFWGFSYWJFY^$.YHMFQQJSLJXYMJXYFYZXVZTѣ
(FWSJLNJ*SIT\RJSYKTW.SYJWSFYNTSFQ5JFHJ&UWNQ
MYYUHFWSJLNJJSIT\RJSYTWL
real-problem-with-ban-treaty-it-challenges-status-quo-
UZG
э ‘Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons’, 
International Court of Justice advisory opinion, 8 July 
Prohibition on the threat of use of nuclear weapons
&XUJHNܪHUWTMNGNYNTSTSYMWJFYTKZXJLTJXGJ^TSI
the existing prohibition on threats of military 
force under the UN Charter.8 Such a prohibition 
was not included in comparable treaties banning 
chemical and biological weapons, landmines and 
cluster munitions.9 Taken in combination with the 
preamble, the clear intent of Article 1.1(d) of the 
ban appears to be to prohibit nuclear deterrence, 
because deterrence relies on the threat of use, 
even if the intention is for the threat not to be 
realised. Advocates for a nuclear ban treaty 
had argued for its inclusion on precisely these 
grounds.10  It follows that extended deterrence is 
covered by such a prohibition, both for the state 
making the guarantee, and—via the prohibition 
on assistance, inducement or encouragement 
described below—the umbrella state.
Prohibition on nuclear sharing
In Article 1.1 paragraphs a–c, the ban treaty 
uses language drawn and adapted from the 
NPT. However, the ban discards the compromise 
UFWFLWFUM*MYYU\\\NHOHNOTWLܪQJX
HFXJWJQFYJI&);*3UIK
э Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, ‘The Nuclear Weapons 
Prohibition Treaty: Negotiations and Beyond’, Arms 
Control Today, September 2017, https://www.
armscontrol.org/act/2017-09/features/nuclear-
weapons-prohibition-treaty-negotiations-beyond.
э See Hirofumi Tosaki and Nobuo Hayashi, 
‘Implications of a Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty 
for Japan’, International Law and Policy Institute, 
November 2016, p. 19, http://nwp.ilpi.org/wp-content/
ZUQTFIX.RUQNHFYNTSXTKFUWTMNGNYNTS
for-Japan.pdf.
э See, for example, Ray Acheson, ‘Banning Nuclear 
Weapons: Principles and Elements for a Legally 
Binding Instrument’, Women’s International League for 
5JFHJFSI+WJJITR2FWHMUMYYU\NQUK
TWL\UHTSYJSYZUQTFIX'FSSNSL3ZHQJFW
Weapons-Principles-and-Elements-for-a-Legally-
Binding-Instrument.pdf.
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on which that language was based, and, in 
Article 1.1(g), outlaws ‘stationing, installation or 
deployment’ of another country’s nuclear weapons 
TSTSJѣXT\SYJWWNYTW^9MNXNXNSJKKJHYFXUJHNܪH
prohibition on NATO nuclear sharing. It would also 
prohibit the redeployment of US tactical nuclear 
weapons to South Korea.
Prohibition on assistance, encouragement or 
inducement 
Taken in combination with the prohibition on 
threat of use, Article 1.1(e) is the key provision that 
widens the aim of the ban treaty to include not just 
possessor or host states, but also those which 
rely on extended nuclear deterrence—whether 
or not any nuclear hardware is involved. Just as 
the prohibition on threat of use takes the ban 
treaty beyond the UN Charter, this prohibition on 
assistance, encouragement or inducement takes 
the ban treaty beyond the rules of the Articles on 
State Responsibility, by prohibiting assistance to 
any state in violating the ban, whether that state is 
a party to the ban or not.11 
In other words, even if the nuclear powers do not 
join the ban treaty, any non-nuclear-weapon state 
that does join will be prohibited from assisting, 
encouraging or inducing a nuclear-armed state 
to violate the treaty, including the prohibition on 
threat of use. This must surely include any reliance 
on an extended nuclear deterrence guarantee, as 
well as support to extended nuclear deterrence 
operations.12
There are two notable omissions from the 
э John Borrie et al., ‘A Prohibition on Nuclear 
Weapons: A Guide to the Issues’, UNIDIR, February 
UUўMYYUZSNINWTWLܪQJXUZGQNHFYNTSX
pdfs/a-prohibition-on-nuclear-weapons-a-guide-to-the-
NXXZJXJSUIK
э8JJ'TWWNJJYFQU >FXRNS&ܪSFJYFQ
‘Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty: 
Nuts and Bolts of the Ban / The New Treaty: Taking 
8YTHPѣ:3.).7UMYYU\\\ZSNINWTWLܪQJX
publications/pdfs/-en-687.pdf; and Kjølv Egeland, 
‘A Nuclear Ban Treaty and Relations with Non-Party 
treaty text: a prohibition on transit of nuclear 
weapons through national jurisdiction, and a 
UWTMNGNYNTS TS SZHQJFW\JFUTSX ܪSFSHNSL 9MJ
KTWRJW NX UFWYNHZQFWQ^ XNLSNܪHFSY GJHFZXJ FS
explicit provision on transit could have affected 
extended deterrence by making it harder for the 
United States to work with ban-signatory military 
partners, including by requiring such partners to 
prohibit port calls by ballistic-missile submarines 
FSIT[JWܫNLMYG^SZHQJFWHFUFGQJFNWHWFKY Some 
states declared that they would interpret Article 
I.1(e) on assistance to cover transit, but this is 
unlikely to gain the agreement of all state parties 
to the ban treaty. 
.RUQNHFYNTSX
The future effect of the ban treaty can be 
FXXJXXJI[NFY\TVZJXYNTSXܪWXYQ^\MFY\TZQIGJ
the effect of a nuclear-umbrella state signing the 
YWJFY^$&SINKSTZRGWJQQFXYFYJITJXXNLSKTWYMJ
time being, as appears likely, what would be the 
effects on extended deterrence of other states 
OTNSNSLFSINRUQJRJSYNSLYMJGFS$
Effects of signature by an umbrella state
As a matter of politics, if not law, it would be 
untenable for a state to join the ban treaty 
and continue to accept an extended nuclear 
8YFYJXѣ2FWHMUMYYU\\\LHXUHM
IT\SQTFI
э See Sharon Squassoni, ‘A controversial ban 
and the long game to delegitimize nuclear weapons’, 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 10 July 2017, 
http://thebulletin.org/controversial-ban-and-long-
LFRJIJQJLNYNRN_JSZHQJFW\JFUTSX FSI
Mukhatzhanova, ‘The Nuclear Weapons Prohibition 
Treaty: Negotiations and Beyond’.
э See Mukhatzhanova, ‘‘The Nuclear Weapons 
Prohibition Treaty: Negotiations and Beyond’; and 
Alyn Ware, ‘The ban treaty, transit and national 
implementation: Drawing on the Aotearoa-New 
Zealand experience’, Aotearoa Lawyers for Peace, 
http://www.unfoldzero.org/wp-content/uploads/The-
ban-treaty-transit-and-national-implementation.pdf.
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deterrence guarantee. Even if a legal case could 
GJRFIJNYNXMFWIYTXJJFS^UTQNYNHFQGJSJܪYKTW
a state attempting to manage the contradiction. 
Joining the ban treaty would be a statement 
that an umbrella state had decided to reject 
nuclear weapons in their entirety, including via 
deterrent threats of nuclear retaliation by another 
country. This would mean a decision either to 
‘denuclearise’ extended deterrence—that is, to 
rely on conventional extended deterrence alone—
or to fully break from military cooperation with a 
nuclear power. Insisting that state parties are 
obliged to follow the latter, more drastic course, 
would be stretching the language of the treaty a 
long way, but it is not impossible to imagine some 
countries making that argument. Here, it is notable 
that the ban does not include an ‘interoperability’ 
provision similar to the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions, to make clear that non-nuclear-related 
military cooperation with a nuclear-armed power 
is permitted.16
Even the narrower interpretation, however, would 
WJVZNWJ[JW^XNLSNܪHFSYHMFSLJXKWTRYMJIJUFWYNSL
umbrella state. Japan, South Korea and Australia 
would have to forswear their extended nuclear 
deterrence guarantees and cease assistance 
to operations relating to nuclear deterrence of 
North Korea and China. This would not only mean 
removing language relating to extended nuclear 
э Which of these two options is legally demanded 
by the treaty is a question for debate. A maximalist 
interpretation of the treaty might assert that any 
military cooperation with a nuclear state or nuclear 
alliance would be prohibited, even if it did not include 
any acceptance of a nuclear guarantee or material 
support for nuclear planning, threats or use. The 
United States has used this possibility in warning 
partner states not to sign the ban. See, for example, 
‘US Defence Secretary Mattis warned Sweden not to 
XNLSFSYNSZHQJFW\JFUTSXYWJFY^WJUTWYѣ9MJ1THFQ
&ZLZXYMYYUX\\\YMJQTHFQXJZX
defence-secretary-mattis-warned-sweden-not-to-sign-
anti-nuclear-weapons-treaty-report. 
э Tosaki and Hayashi, ‘Implications of a Nuclear 
Weapons Ban Treaty for Japan’, pp. 17–18
deterrence from defence white papers and 
national-security strategies, and ceasing nuclear 
aspects of extended-deterrence dialogues with 
the US; it could also mean ending support to US 
deployment of dual-capable strategic assets, 
whether nuclear-armed or not. (South Korea, 
KTWJ]FRUQJMFXUJWRNYYJIT[JWܫNLMYTK'FSI
' GTRGJWX NS XMT\X TK KTWHJ FLFNSXY 3TWYM
0TWJFFSIUWT[NIJIܪLMYJWOJYXZUUTWY17) It could 
also involve halting or altering nuclear-related 
cooperation via shared assets such as Australia’s 
Pine Gap base.18 
The case of NATO is in some ways even more 
complex, both because decisions taken by 
one ally affect the others, and because NATO’s 
policy and institutional arrangements relating to 
nuclear weapons are more elaborate and explicit. 
NATO declaratory policy contains a number of 
references to nuclear weapons, including the 
statement that ‘as long as nuclear weapons exist, 
NATO will remain a nuclear alliance’.19 It also refers 
not only to forward-deployed US nuclear weapons 
but on ‘capabilities and infrastructure’ provided by 
members of the NPG, as well as a commitment 
э8JJKTWJ]FRUQJѢ:8ܫNJX'T[JW8TZYM
Korea after North’s nuclear test’, Reuters, 11 January 
2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-
SZHQJFWZXܫNJXGT[JWXTZYMPTWJFFKYJWSTWYMX
SZHQJFWYJXYNI:80(3:3> FSIѢ:8XF^X
it sent B-2 stealth bombers over South Korea’, CNN, 
2FWHMMYYUJINYNTSHSSHTR
\TWQIFXNFPTWJFZXGܫNLMYXNSIJ]MYRQ
э,N[JSYMJNSMJWJSYINKܪHZQY^NS[JWNK^NSLYMJXJ
changes, and indeed the absence of any suggestion 
NSYMJGFSYWJFY^TKMT\XZHM[JWNܪHFYNTS\TZQIYFPJ
place, a state could sign the ban and simply violate 
it in this way in secret. The political risks of doing so 
would be severe, however, and it is hard to see why 
a state would be motivated to reject US extended 
nuclear deterrence in public and continue to materially 
support it in private.
э NATO, Warsaw Summit Communiqué, 9 July 
UFWFLWFUMMYYU\\\SFYTNSYHUXJS
SFYTMVTKܪHNFQDYJ]YXDMYR
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to modernising ‘all components of NATO’s nuclear 
deterrent’, and ensuring the ‘broadest possible 
participation’ of allies in nuclear burden-sharing.20
A NATO signatory to the ban treaty would be 
faced with an onerous series of steps to give even 
a basic appearance of compliance. It would have 
to leave the Nuclear Planning Group. It would 
have to declare that it rejected any use or threat 
of use of nuclear weapons in its defence by the 
Alliance. It would have to explicitly disassociate 
itself with current NATO declaratory policy, and 
lobby to either to remove all references to nuclear 
weapons in future consensus NATO statements, 
or caveat them to exclude itself.21 If the state in 
VZJXYNTS\FXTSJTKYMJܪ[J\MNHMMTXYX:8'
gravity bombs, it would have to publicly declare 
their presence— breaking long-standing NATO 
policy—and then ask the US to remove them by a 
deadline set by members of the ban treaty. 
NATO sets great value in unity, and there is no 
real precedent for states taking such steps. 
When some hosts of US nuclear weapons were 
pressing for their removal in 2009–10, unity 
won the day, with the alliance deciding that the 
weapons should only be withdrawn by collective 
agreement. This remains the explanation given by 
states such as the Netherlands, where domestic 
opposition to nuclear weapons is strong, for not 
unilaterally expelling the US B-61s. Comparisons 
to nuclear-armed France’s non-membership of 
the NPG are spurious;22 comparisons to Iceland 
and Lithuania, which do not allow nuclear 
weapons onto their soil, are more relevant but 
still inadequate. A ban signatory would either 
э Ibid. 
э A partial caveat could be provided by the 
footnote on policy that limits some nuclear language 
to members of the NPG—but this does not currently 
apply to broader language on the role of nuclear 
weapons in NATO’s deterrence and defence posture.
э See, for example, Stein-Ivar Lothe Eide, ‘A Ban on 
3ZHQJFW<JFUTSX<MFYѣX.S.YKTW3&94$ѣ.SYJWSFYNTSFQ
1F\FSI5TQNH^.SXYNYZYJ+JGWZFW^UUFSI
э Eide, ‘A Ban on Nuclear Weapons: What’s In It for 
3&94$ѣUUў
have to explicitly disassociate itself from central 
tenets of NATO policy, or seek to change them. 
Either option would be greeted with vigorous 
opposition from several allies, and would risk a 
highly damaging split. No NATO country currently 
appears willing to bear such political costs. On the 
opening of the ban treaty for signature the North 
Atlantic Council released a statement rejecting 
the ban, denying any change in Allied nations’ 
legal obligations arising from it, and denying 
that the treaty contributes to the development of 
customary international law. 
The broader political effects on extended 
deterrence of signature by an umbrella state 
HTZQIGJXNLSNܪHFSY.SYMJ3&94HTSYJ]YFSZLQ^
argument between allies could be interpreted by 
Russia as evidence that the Article V commitment 
to defend a NATO state under attack would not 
hold in time of crisis. In the Northeast Asian 
context, rejection of the US nuclear umbrella could 
leave states more susceptible to North Korean 
nuclear blackmail, and would likely be taken by 
China as an opportunity to peel allies away from 
the US and further into its own orbit. 
Effects of signature by third parties
If no umbrella states sign the treaty, could it 
still affect extended deterrence through its 
NRUQJRJSYFYNTSG^TYMJWHTZSYWNJX$9MJTRNXXNTS
TK J]UQNHNY UWTMNGNYNTSX TS YWFSXNY FSI ܪSFSHNSL
is likely to considerably reduce the practical 
impact of large numbers of states joining the 
treaty. This is not to say it removes the impact 
entirely. Activists are likely to use the ban as the 
basis for campaigns for states to divest from 
nuclear-weapons-related investments, and to lead 
boycotts of companies associated with nuclear-
weapons supply chains. However, it is unlikely 
that a state party will have both the political intent 
FSI XZKܪHNJSY RFYJWNFQ HTSSJHYNTS YT SZHQJFW
weapons infrastructure to have a fatal impact on 
extended nuclear deterrence. 
э ‘North Atlantic Council Statement on the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’, 20 
September 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
SJ\XDMYR
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Instead, the long-term challenge comes from the 
potential impacts of the treaty on the perceived 
legitimacy of nuclear weapons. The umbrella 
states’ balancing act is not easy to maintain. 
Japan, for obvious reasons of national heritage, 
is an enthusiastic actor in nuclear disarmament 
diplomacy; yet the demands of alliance with the 
United States and extended nuclear deterrence 
led Japan to violate its own famous ‘three non-
nuclear principles’ by permitting the transit of 
US nuclear weapons. Japanese diplomats are 
F\FWJ YMFY YMJ^FWJ YWJFINSLFܪSJ QNSJ7ZXXNFѣX
invasion of Ukraine may have made it easier for 
3&94YTܪSIFUWTSZHQJFWHTSXJSXZXGZYGTYMYMJ
introduction of modernised B-61 gravity bombs, 
FSIYMJNRUJSINSLSFYNTSFQIJHNXNTSXG^YMJܪ[J
states that currently host US nuclear weapons 
on whether to procure new dual-capable aircraft 
to deliver them, will likely reopen old debates. 
Moreover, in recent years, Russia has made 
increasingly strident, if disingenuous, charges 
that NATO nuclear sharing violates the NPT. 
The combination of Russian mischief and ban-
enabled grandstanding could prove troublesome 
in the next NPT review cycle. The existence of 
the ban treaty provides anti-nuclear campaigners 
in the host countries with an extra political tool, 
and even if host states do not sign the ban, they 
RNLMYܪSINYRTWJINKܪHZQYYTOZXYNK^YMJHTSYNSZJI
presence of nuclear weapons on home soil.
Predicting the normative success of any treaty 
NXINKܪHZQY9MJܪWXY YWZQ^HWZHNFQ359 WFYNܪHFYNTS
by a near-nuclear state was West Germany in 
 XJ[JS ^JFWX FKYJW YMJ YWJFY^ TUJSJI KTW
signature. The fact that it currently looks unlikely 
that an umbrella state will sign the ban treaty 
does not mean that this will always be true. In 
the meantime, positions can change. Australia’s 
Labor Party, for example, included support for 
the negotiation of a nuclear ban treaty in its 2016 
national platform.26 The balance of international 
opinion could also be tipped were the ban treaty 
to be used as the basis for reconsidering the 1996 
э See Mark Fitzpatrick, Asia’s Latent Nuclear 
Powers (Routledge for the IISS, 2016), chapter 2.
э Australian Labor Party, ‘A Smart, Modern, Fair 
Australia’, 2016 National Platform, paragraph 87, 
ICJ advisory opinion, this time that the treaty’s 
existence demonstrated a new consensus that 
use under any circumstances would be unlawful.
9MJWTFIFMJFI
The ban treaty, in possession of a simple moral 
argument and with the wind in its sails, will not 
be easy to ignore. Yet umbrella states have little 
option but to try to maintain their balancing act, 
even in the face of this new political challenge. The 
359KTWFQQNYXܫF\XMFXMJQUJIFHMNJ[JFRJFXZWJ
of nuclear order, and must be defended. Extended 
SZHQJFWIJYJWWJSHJFQYMTZLMUTQNYNHFQQ^INKܪHZQYNX
vastly less destabilising than nuclear proliferation 
by the allies. And a process of incremental, 
[JWNܪFGQJFSIJSKTWHJFGQJFLWJJRJSYXџMT\J[JW
tortuous—is still the only credible path to global 
nuclear disarmament. The seductive clarity of 
prohibition is no substitute for agreements which 
bind the nuclear-armed states and which can be 
made to stick.
“The ban treaty, in 
possession of a simple 
moral argument and with 
the wind in its sails, will 
not be easy to ignore. 
Yet umbrella states have 
little option but to try to 
maintain their balancing 
act, even in the face of this 
new political challenge. 9MJ359 KTWFQQ NYXܫF\X
has helped achieve a 
measure of nuclear order, 
and must be defended.”
The umbrella states’ task will have to be 
approached more directly than before, however. 
The ban’s supporters are well aware that extended 
nuclear deterrence is a touchy political subject. 
Being called a ‘weasel’ stings, and the charge of 
hypocrisy will remain effective as long as umbrella 
https://cdn.australianlabor.com.au/documents/ALP_
National_Platform.pdf.
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states remain reluctant to defend extended nuclear 
deterrence openly and explicitly.27  Governments 
of umbrella states that wish to maintain extended 
deterrence should articulate a clear rationale for 
why they believe it is necessary. 
In the current bleak security environment, this 
should not be impossible. After the annexation 
of Crimea, and given Russia’s willingness to 
use nuclear threats to underpin its disruption to 
the European order, NATO states have plenty of 
material to work with in explaining to their citizens 
why deterrence is important. In Northeast Asia, 
North Korea presents such an acute threat, and 
China such a vast, chronic one, that the need 
for deterrence is practically self-evident—and 
extended nuclear deterrence is greatly preferable 
to the development of nuclear weapons on the 
part of the allies themselves.
Such arguments should not overreach, of course. 
The oxygen feeding the nuclear ban treaty is 
the stalemate in traditional arms control and 
disarmament, and the defence of extended 
deterrence should be combined with efforts to 
move those processes along. This is an easy 
recommendation to make in general terms, and a 
INKܪHZQYTSJYT YZWS NSYTXUJHNܪHXLN[JSYMFY YMJ
fate of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty is in 
the hands of the United States Senate, and crucial 
support for negotiations on a Fissile-Material Cut-
TKK9WJFY^YTGJLNSRZXYܪWXYHTRJKWTR5FPNXYFS
and China. Engagement, in the meantime, in such 
initiatives as the International Partnership for 
3ZHQJFW )NXFWRFRJSY ;JWNܪHFYNTS NX \JQHTRJ
but no game-changer. 
Two immediate crises—over North Korea’s 
nuclear programme, and over Russia’s violation 
of the INF Treaty—will generate pressure for the 
further forward deployment of non-strategic 
nuclear weapons on allies’ territory. Such moves 
would be counterproductive: ineffective in 
deterring the adversary, potentially destabilising, 
and a hindrance to political dialogue. The reasons 
э The term was popularised by Richard Lennane, 
TKYMJINXFWRFRJSYLWTZU<NQIܪWJ8JJKTWJ]FRUQJ
MYYU\\\\NQIܪWJ[TWL<JFXJQDܫ^JWUIK
to resist them extend far beyond the ban treaty. 
But in order to manage the divisions that the ban 
treaty exacerbates, and to maintain extended 
deterrence while leaving the door open to future 
progress in disarmament, the umbrella states will 
need to show restraint. 
Apart from these essentially negative 
recommendations, the umbrella states are left 
with the uninspiring, but nevertheless important, 
task of holding the line in anticipation of progress 
elsewhere. The contribution of states such as 
Germany to the Open-Ended Working Group shows 
ways of arguing for the continued necessity of 
both extended nuclear deterrence and consensus-
based approaches to disarmament. 
“...umbrella states should 
engage more deeply in 
publicly exploring the 
conditions necessary 
for serious nuclear 
disarmament to take 
place...”
Following that example, umbrella states should 
engage more deeply in publicly exploring 
the conditions necessary for serious nuclear 
disarmament to take place — a discussion 
which should help demonstrate why achieving 
disarmament is not a simple matter of generating 
XZKܪHNJSYUTQNYNHFQ\NQQ-JWJZRGWJQQFXYFYJXFSI
others) should draw a contrast with the ban-treaty 
approach by communicating a clear principle: if 
nuclear disarmament measures are intended to 
GJ QJLFQQ^GNSINSL YMJS YMJ^XMTZQIGJ[JWNܪFGQJ
and enforceable. Legally binding measures which 
FWJSTY[JWNܪFGQJFSIJSKTWHJFGQJFKYJWFQQMNSIJW
only those—such as the umbrella states—that 
tend to abide by the rule of law. 
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“A window of 
opportunity exists in 
which to help mitigate 
some of the potential 
longer-term effects of 
a ban that critics of the 
treaty have warned of...”
Andrea Berger
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Following the adoption of a treaty prohibiting 
nuclear weapons, Christopher Ford, the US 
National Security Council’s director for weapons 
of mass destruction, lambasted the ban as a “step 
backward” on the road to nuclear disarmament.1 
Many opponents of the treaty agree with his view 
that the ban represents not only an “ineffective 
measure”, but also a potentially damaging one 
\NYM WJXUJHY YT XFKJLZFWIX [JWNܪHFYNTS FSI YMJ
wider Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.2  
Yet beyond these points of agreement, the treaty’s 
critics begin to diverge in their approach to the 
ban. Some engaged informally with negotiating 
parties about the proposed treaty, whilst others 
wanted no such interaction. /FUFS HTSܫNHYJI
эѦ'WNJܪSLTS3ZHQJFW'FS9WJFY^G^38(8JSNTW
Director Christopher Ford”, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Washington DC, 22 August 
2017, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/08/22/
GWNJܪSLTSSZHQJFWGFSYWJFY^G^SXHXJSNTWINWJHYTW
HMWNXYTUMJWKTWIJ[JSY#
э.GNI
э*RNQ)FQQMFXUTNSYJITZYYMJINKKJWJSHJX
in approach between NATO countries, using 
the Netherlands and Norway as examples. His 
analysis rightly notes the continued importance 
of domestic politics in determining how countries 
– even those sceptical of the ban – posture 
towards the treaty. See Emil Dall, “A Balancing Act: 
NATO States and the Nuclear Ban Treaty”, Issue 
Brief, European Leadership Network, July 2017, 
<http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/
RJINFQNGWFW^JHGJ

3ZHQJFW
'FS
9WJFY^
.XXZJX
'WNJKUIK#
by its longstanding support for disarmament 
and its simultaneous position within a security 
alliance reliant on nuclear weapons, had periodic 
and informal interaction with ban proponents 
while negotiations were taking place. China, for 
its part, not only had exploratory discussions on 
participating in the negotiation conference, but 
has altogether avoided directly criticising the ban. 
Beijing’s approach also highlighted wider 
differences over the appropriate tone to adopt 
towards supporters of the prohibition. Some 
opponents chose a confrontational style, whilst 
others preferred a milder approach, conscious 
of their desire not to contribute to further 
fracturing the non-proliferation and disarmament 
community. It is for this reason that when the 
US Ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki 
Haley, held a press conference to denounce the 
proposed prohibition in March 2017, some North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners 
agreed to stand behind her, while others refused. 
These differences remain apparent now that 
a treaty has been negotiated and opened for 
signature. However, they must be managed if 
XZUUTWYJWXFSITUUTSJSYXTKFGFSFWJYTܪSIF
mutually agreeable way to advance NPT-focused 
initiatives in the years ahead. Ban sceptics should 
RFPJJ[JW^JKKTWYYTHTFQJXHJFWTZSIܪ[JUTNSYX
of policy with respect to disarmament and its 
future within the wider NPT regime. These may 
э.SYJW[NJ\\NYMFWJUWJXJSYFYN[JTKFSTSSZHQJFW
weapon state critical of the ban, 17 August 2017, 
Geneva.
э2NHMJQQJ3NHMTQXѦ:8'WNYFNS+WFSHJTYMJWXXPNU
nuclear weapons ban treaty talks”, Reuters, 27 March 
2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-
un/u-s-britain-france-others-skip-nuclear-weapons-
GFSYWJFY^YFQPXNI:80'3>6.#
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appear controversial now, but are likely to be less 
contentious as the ban negotiations fade further 
into the distance. They therefore merit early 
consideration. 
Firstly, opponents of the ban should accept that 
the treaty exists, that it will probably enter into 
force in the next several years, and that it will likely 
GJKFNWQ^\NIJQ^WFYNܪJIFRTSLXYYMJHTZSYWNJXYMFY
participated in negotiations. In other words, the 
ban will, at least in principle, be part of the future 
international legal architecture for disarmament. 
Opponents should not be expected to accept these 
eventualities immediately. As statements made 
by some nuclear weapons states indicate, there 
is considerable and understandable frustration 
and concern over both the treaty’s existence and 
its content. Members of the non-proliferation and 
disarmament community should anticipate that 
some critics will continue to make sternly-worded 
condemnations of the treaty in the near-term, 
laying out their positions on the ban in forums like 
the General Assembly. 
Eventually, however, opponents should take a 
more pragmatic view of the way ahead, and 
agree on a moderate tone and posture. Press 
conferences like the one held by Nikki Haley in 
March 2017 should be avoided. NATO should 
refrain from making joint statements or otherwise 
acting as a bloc in disarmament settings, which 
would formalize additional lines of division 
between groups within the NPT community. 
This recommendation is not intended to imply 
that opponents of the treaty should ignore any 
continuing concerns about the ban, or refrain from 
acting to mitigate them. Those within nuclear 
alliances should continue to enhance alliance 
solidarity, improve assurance measures, and 
address perceived sources of insecurity whilst 
avoiding recourse to the type of nuclear expansion 
that US President Donald Trump has called for.6 
э8YJ[J-TQQFSIѦ9WZRU\FSYXYTRFPJXZWJ:8
nuclear arsenal at ‘top of the pack’”, Reuters, 27 
February 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-trump-exclusive/trump-wants-to-make-sure-u-s-
nuclear-arsenal-at-top-of-the-pack-idUSKBN1622IF 
Experts participating in the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace’s task force on Russia and 
Ukraine policy, in the Deep Cuts Commission, and 
in the European Leadership Network -- amongst 
others -- have laid out practical suggestions for 
improving Euro-Atlantic security in this fashion.7 
Heightened tensions between North Korea and 
the United States have similarly led to a more 
active discussion on how to responsibly assure 
Japan and South Korea in the face of Pyongyang’s 
advancing nuclear and missile capabilities. A 
softer tone towards the ban should not dampen 
these efforts. 
Similarly, critics of the treaty who fear damage 
YT YMJ NSYJWSFYNTSFQ XFKJLZFWIX FSI [JWNܪHFYNTS
regimes should seek assurances that countries 
do not intend to undermine existing progress, 
‘forum shop’,8 or roll back their safeguards 
commitments, for example. Countries who worry 
that ban proponents will push for a second 
International Court of Justice advisory opinion 
on nuclear weapons, or for the development of 
customary international law, are right to express 
эѦ,ZNINSL5WNSHNUQJXKTWF8ZXYFNSFGQJ:8
Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia: Key 
Judgments from a Joint Task Force”, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 9 February 
2017, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/09/
guiding-principles-for-sustainable-u.s.-policy-toward-
russia-ukraine-and-eurasia-key-judgments-from-
OTNSYYFXPKTWHJUZG#8JJFQXTѦ'FHPKWTR
the Brink: Toward Restraint and Dialogue between 
Russia and the West”, Deep Cuts Commission, June 
2016, <http://www.deepcuts.org/images/PDF/
Third_Report_of_the_Deep_Cuts_Commission_English.
UIK# FSIѦ*SXZWNSL*ZWT&YQFSYNH8JHZWNY^ѧ*ZWTUJFS
Leadership Network, 16 February 2017, <http://www.
europeanleadershipnetwork.org/ensuring-euro-
FYQFSYNHXJHZWNY^DMYRQ#
э&IFR2TZSYFSI7NHMFWI3JUMJ\Ѧ&SZHQJFW
\JFUTSXGFSXMTZQIܪWXYITSTMFWRYTYMJ359ѧ
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 7 March 2017, 
<http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-weapons-ban-should-
ܪWXYITSTMFWRSUY#
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their concerns. Yet they should also carefully 
evaluate whether it is necessary to reiterate at 
the outset of every statement that they will never 
under any circumstances sign the treaty9 – a 
choice directed by national legal advisors eager to 
ensure their status as persistent objectors to the 
ban is clear.10 More moderate language integrated 
QFYJW NS SFYNTSFQXYFYJRJSYXXMTZQI GJ XZKܪHNJSY
to communicate persistent objection, especially 
after months of the type of legalistic statements 
currently being delivered, and would help improve 
the atmosphere in disarmament fora. 
8JHTSIQ^ GFS HWNYNHX XMTZQI \TWP YT ܪSI F \F^
to reconcile the various long-term disarmament 
models within the NPT community. Without some 
agreement on how to talk about the future road 
to disarmament, and on the conditions necessary 
to facilitate the elimination of nuclear weapons, 
deadlock in forums that cover these issues is sure 
to persist and fester. As Lewis Dunn has argued, 
ban opponents and supporters alike should 
“agree on a shared vision of the nuclear future 
эѦ/TNSY8YFYJRJSYKWTRYMJ5JWRFSJSY
Representatives to the United Nations of the United 
States, United Kingdom and France Following the 
Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons”, 
United States Mission to the United Nations, 7 July 
!MYYUXZXZSXYFYJLT[WJRFWPX#8JJ
also “Conference On Disarmament Holds First Public 
Plenaries Since The Third And Last Part Of Its 2017 
8JXXNTS8YFWYJI4S/ZQ^ѧ:SNYJI3FYNTSX4KܪHJFY
Geneva, 22 August 2017, <https://www.unog.ch/unog/
website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/F9
(''&++'(+'$4UJS)THZ
RJSY#Ѧ+WFSHJJSITWXJIYMJXYFYJRJSYѰWJFITZYG^
the United States on behalf of the United States, the 
United Kingdom and France on the adoption of a treaty 
banning nuclear weapons…France read out another 
statement by its Representative in New York…saying 
the treaty was not binding to France.”
э.SYJW[NJ\\NYMFWJUWJXJSYFYN[JTKFSZHQJFW
weapons state, Geneva, 17 August 2017.
and build the conditions for its realization”.11 
This is a feasible goal. No states are currently 
seriously questioning the validity or desirability of 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or a proposed 
Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, simply because 
of the advent of a ban. Recent meetings of the 
MNLMQJ[JQ J]UJWYX LWTZU TS ܪXXNQJ RFYJWNFQX KTW
example, do not seem to have been affected by 
changes in the wider disarmament landscape.12 
Any nuclear risk reduction efforts, arms control 
measures, or transparency initiatives that arise in 
the coming years would continue to be welcomed 
by non-nuclear weapon states alike. 
9MJ TGXYFHQJ YT ܪSINSL F UFYM KTW\FWI FY QJFXY
in the near- and medium- term, is theoretical: no 
HTSXYWZHY MFX GJJS NIJSYNܪJI KTW INXFWRFRJSY
discussions that is agreeable both to those who 
have consistently argued that a prohibition should 
GJYMJܪWXYXYJUFSIYMTXJ\MTFWJFIFRFSYYMFY
it should have been the last. Creative thinking 
NXSJJIJI YT ܪSIF HTRRTS GFXNX KTW HTZSYWNJX
to talk about these issues in future. Initiatives 
like the Japanese-led Group of Eminent Persons 
for the Substantive Advancement of Nuclear 
DisarmamentHTZQIMJQUܪQQYMNX[TNI
Third, opponents of the ban should avoid any 
temptation to let the ban, and anger and divisions 
caused by it, justify their withdrawal from efforts 
to advance other arms control and disarmament-
KTHZXJI NSNYNFYN[JX 9MJ XTHFQQJI 5 5WTHJXX
э(TRRJSYXG^1J\NX&)ZSSNSѦ,QTGFQ
Perspectives on a Nuclear Weapons Ban 
9WJFY^ѧ3ZHQJFW9MWJFY.SNYNFYN[J&ZLZXY
<http://www.nti.org/analysis/atomic-pulse/
LQTGFQUJWXUJHYN[JXSZHQJFW\JFUTSXGFSYWJFY^#
э.SYJW[NJ\\NYMFWJUWJXJSYFYN[JTKFSTSSZHQJFW
weapon state involved in the initiative, Geneva, 17 
August 2017.
э8YFYJRJSYG^-*&RGFXXFITW0TWT'JXXMTFY
the High-Level Meeting to Commemorate and Promote 
the International Day for the Total Elimination of 
Nuclear Weapons, 26 September 2017, Permanent 
Mission of Japan to the United Nations, <http://www.
ZSJRGOFUFSLTOUNYUWDJSGJXXMTMYRQ#
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which was set up by the United Kingdom in 2009 
YTUWTRTYJKZWYMJWYWZXYFSIHTSܪIJSHJGZNQINSL
between the recognised nuclear weapon states, 
should continue to meet. Concerningly, the group 
did not hold an annual conference in 2017 as it 
had originally planned. Indeed, it showed few 
signs of life at all. 9MNX XMTZQI GJ WJHYNܪJI G^
WJ[N[NSLJFWQNJW5RJJYNSLXXYWFYJLNHXYFGNQNY^KTW
example. Efforts focused on improving strategic 
XYFGNQNY^ GJY\JJS YMJ ܪ[J HTZQI GJ J]UFSIJI
potentially to include discussions over nuclear 
‘threat’ or ‘risk’ reduction. Such initiatives may not 
produce concrete, tangible improvements in arms 
control or transparency involving the Nuclear 
Weapons States, at least while wider security 
relations between these countries remain poor. Yet 
regularizing such meetings is intrinsically valuable 
over the longer term, and they ensure ministries 
from Moscow to Beijing and Washington remain 
engaged with these important subjects. 
Other groups, such as the Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament Initiative -- comprised of ten NPT 
members with diverging views on the ban treaty 
-- should heed the same advice. Since the group’s 
creation in 2010, its diversity and consensus-
based decision-making has been its strength. 
Because the NPDI brings together umbrella 
states with strong disarmament advocates, it 
acts as an NPT microcosm and thus a forum in 
which creative ideas related to transparency, 
arms control, and disarmament can be tested. At 
least one of its participants has quietly suggested 
that, in the wake of the ban treaty’s adoption, 
the NPDI refrain from working on these issues; 
IN[NIJXTSINXFWRFRJSYRF^ST\GJYTTINKܪHZQY
э9MJXJUQFSX\JWJTZYQNSJINSYMJLWTZUѣX
statement. See “Joint Statement from the Nuclear 
<JFUTSX8YFYJXFYYMJ<FXMNSLYTS)(5
(TSKJWJSHJѧ:88YFYJ)JUFWYRJSY8JUYJRGJW
2016. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
UXMYR#.YNXQNPJQ^YMFYYMJTSLTNSL
US Nuclear Posture Review contributed to a decline in 
momentum within the group in 2017.
э.SFIN[JWLJSHJKWTRXYFSIFWIUWFHYNHJYMJ5INI
not make a statement at the 2017 NPT Preparatory 
Committee.
to bridge, and could irreparably fracture the group 
if exposed.16  
Retreating from an area central to the NPDI’s 
mission would be both unnecessary and 
misguided. Since its creation, the NPDI has 
promoted initiatives to increase nuclear 
transparency,17 and it should continue to do so. 
After years of dialogue amongst each other 
and with nuclear possessors, NPDI members 
know that making progress on this subject is 
immensely challenging. Yet they also know that 
these challenges have little to do with a ban, 
and that enhancing nuclear transparency and 
accountability remains as important as ever.  The 
NPDI should therefore stand by the declaration it 
made at the 2017 NPT Preparatory Committee: 
“differences exist with regard to the ongoing 
negotiations of a legally binding instrument to 
prohibit nuclear weapons…They will not, however, 
affect our undertaking to continue working 
towards the implementation of the 2010 NPT 
Action Plan.”18 
+TZWYMQ^ TUUTSJSYX XMTZQI \TWP YT ܪSI TW FY
least remain open to, creative initiatives related 
to arms control and disarmament, which engage 
both ban supporters and critics. The International 
5FWYSJWXMNUKTW3ZHQJFW)NXFWRFRJSY;JWNܪHFYNTS
(IPNDV), which aims to develop technical solutions 
KTWRTSNYTWNSLFSI[JWNܪHFYNTSHMFQQJSLJXFSIYT
lay a foundation for further nuclear reductions, 
эSYJW[NJ\X\NYMFSTKܪHNFQKWTRFS35).RJRGJW
FSI&ZLZXY,JSJ[F&STYMJWTKܪHNFQTK
an NPDI country, interviewed on 17 August 2017 
in Geneva, remarked that the group faced external 
pressure to abstain from these issues as well. 
эѦ8YFYJRJSYTKYMJ9MNWI2NSNXYJWNFQ2JJYNSLTKYMJ
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative,” New 
York, 21 September 2011, <www.foreignminister.gov.
FZWJQJFXJXPWDRWDFMYRQ#
эѦ3TSUWTQNKJWFYNTSFSI)NXFWRFRJSY.SNYNFYN[J/TNSY
Statement to the First Session of the NPT PrepCom”, 
;NJSSF2F^!MYYUWJFHMNSLHWNYNHFQ\NQQ
org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/
UWJUHTRXYFYJRJSYX2F^D35).UIK#
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is an excellent example.19 IPNDV is co-led 
by the United States and the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative, and brings together a diverse range of 
governmental and non-governmental experts. Its 
practical and technical focus allows participants 
to put aside higher-level disarmament politics 
and collaborate. Additional initiatives that 
create space for NWS-NNWS cooperation in 
disarmament-, arms control-, or risk-reduction 
related areas are needed. Non-governmental 
experts, whether supporters or opponents of the 
ban, should help generate ideas for new activities 
with these characteristics. 
Finally, states should strive to make progress on all 
the above before the 2020 NPT Review Conference. 
A window of opportunity exists in which to help 
mitigate some of the potential longer-term effects 
of a ban that critics of the treaty have warned of: 
an NPT community distracted from meaningful 
progress on non-proliferation and peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy; a cascade of further initiatives 
that disenfranchise and target nuclear weapons 
states and their treaty allies; and damage to the 
XFKJLZFWIX FSI [JWNܪHFYNTS WJLNRJX 'FYYJSNSL
down the hatches, maintaining a confrontational 
approach to ban proponents, or even slinking 
into apathy are approaches that may mean these 
UWTUMJHNJXXJQKKZQܪQ
9MJ^JFW\NQQGJYMJ359ѣXܪKYNJYMGNWYMIF^.Y
\NQQFQXTGJNYXY\JSY^ܪKYMFSSN[JWXFW^TKNSIJܪSNYJ
extension – the year when several countries 
FWLZJI IZWNSL YMJ  SJLTYNFYNTSX YMFY YMJ
Treaty should be up for renewal.20 These countries 
FLWJJI YT XNLS TS YT F UWTUTXFQ YT NSIJܪSNYJQ^
extend the treaty, as long as others (especially 
nuclear weapons states) pursued additional 
efforts to strengthen the NPT review process and 
make progress on ‘principles and objectives’ for 
эѦ.SYJWSFYNTSFQ5FWYSJWXMNUKTW3ZHQJFW
)NXFWRFRJSY;JWNܪHFYNTSѧ3ZHQJFW9MWJFY.SNYNFYN[J
<http://www.nti.org/about/projects/international-
UFWYSJWXMNUSZHQJFWINXFWRFRJSY[JWNܪHFYNTS#
э4SJUWTUTXFQUZYKTWYMFYYMJYNRJ\FXKTWYMJ
9WJFY^YTGJJ]YJSIJIKTWUJWNTIXTK^JFWXFSI
renewable on a rolling basis.
nuclear disarmament. At the time, Indonesia’s 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
noted that if the nuclear weapon states and 
TYMJWX \MT FWLZJI KTW NSIJܪSNYJ J]YJSXNTS \JWJ
not prepared to implement these commitments, 
TYMJWX\MTXZUUTWYJIF^JFWUJWNTI\TZQIKJJQ
it was a “betrayal”.21
A second consecutive Review Conference 
implosion in 2020, on the eve that the Treaty was 
intended by some to be up for renewal, could 
make this feeling palpable. It would signal that 
NPT members’ differences over disarmament 
may be irreconcilable – a signal that they have 
long sought to avoid. Five steps, taken by critics 
of the new nuclear weapons ban treaty, could help 
them avoid it again. 
э.SYJW[NJ\\NYM&RGFXXFITW3ZLWTMT<NXSZRZWYN
Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the 
:SNYJI3FYNTSXNS8ZXFS'<JQXM)JQJLFYJ
UJWXUJHYN[JXTSYMJ359WJ[NJ\FSIJ]YJSXNTS
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&X \J FUUWTFHM YMJ YM FSSN[JWXFW^ TK YMJ
signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT), progress on nuclear arms control and 
disarmament has stalled. No nuclear arms control 
negotiations are taking place between any of the 
nuclear armed states, yet nuclear dangers are 
growing.             21st century geopolitical tensions 
and great power politics make nuclear arms 
HTSYWTQFSIINXFWRFRJSYINKܪHZQYGZYFQQYMJRTWJ
necessary. 
The ban treaty offers a potential new path to the 
eventual elimination of these weapons. Yet the 
contributions to this collection demonstrate why 
it is unlikely that the treaty will be universally 
accepted and why it will not be the disarmament 
panacea that some desperately seek. However, 
the frustration over the lack of disarmament 
progress is real. This frustration gave rise to the 
humanitarian initiative and paved the way for the 
ban treaty. It demonstrates that tolerance for the 
slow pace of disarmament has dissipated and the 
division between those who want to ban nuclear 
weapons now and those who argue that such 
calls are dangerous growing wider. Yet the treaty 
is a symptom not the cause of this division. 
In the coming years, the nuclear ban treaty will likely 
enter into force and become part of the nuclear 
disarmament landscape. Refusing to engage with 
the process won’t deny it legitimacy.                 The 
treaty and other disarmament instruments can 
co-exist and possibly even reinforce one another. 
But for this to happen, the opposing sides need 
YTJSLFLJ\NYMJFHMTYMJWFSIܪSIHTSXYWZHYN[J
ways forward. In particular, if states want to 
ensure that the NPT remains the foremost nuclear 
disarmament treaty, then tangible progress must 
be demonstrated through the step-by-step or 
building-block process. This is not invalidated 
by the adoption of the nuclear ban treaty. Efforts 
include reducing nuclear stockpiles, de-alerting 
weapons on “hair-trigger alert”, shifting nuclear 
ITHYWNSJX YT\FWIX XTQJ UZWUTXJ TW STܪWXYZXJ
extending the New START agreement, sustaining 
the INF Treaty, ratifying the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT), commencing negotiations on 
the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and 
HTSYNSZNSLINXFWRFRJSY[JWNܪHFYNTSWJXJFWHM
7JHTRRJSIFYNTSX
From the contributions and the ideas suggested 
by the authors of this collection a set of 
recommendations can be distilled which could 
pave the way for re-focusing attention away from 
divisive factors and instead bring these opposing 
camps together. 
All States
x All states should clearly articulate their 
strong support for the NPT irrespective of 
whether they support the nuclear ban treaty 
or not. 
x Both treaty proponents and opponents 
XMTZQI OTNSYQ^ WJFKܪWR YMJNWHTRRNYRJSY YT
achieving the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons at the UN General Assembly, the 
NPT Review Conference and its Preparatory 
Committee meetings, or other appropriate 
international fora.
x Supporters, sceptics, and opponents should 
put aside their disagreements over the ban 
YWJFY^ YT ܪSI SJ\ FSI HWJFYN[J \F^X YT
work together on strengthening the nuclear 
disarmament and non-proliferation regime. 
Discussions on how these respective 
approaches can co-exist, and ultimately 
converge, to break the current stalemate 
should take place. Initiatives such as 
the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 
Initiative (NPDI) and the Japanese-led Group 
of Eminent Persons for the Substantive 
Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament 
could be useful platforms for these efforts. 
Nuclear Armed States
x 4KܪHNFQX KWTR SZHQJFW FWRJI XYFYJX XMTZQI
strive to build bridges rather than deepen 
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divides and narrow the gap between 
themselves and the ban treaty’s supporters. 
x Nuclear armed states should attempt to use 
more conciliatory language and tone when 
discussing the nuclear ban treaty and its 
proponents.
x Nuclear Weapon States should continue to 
advance other arms control and disarmament 
NSNYNFYN[JXNSHQZINSLYMWTZLMYMJ55WTHJXX
x All nuclear armed states could consider 
participating as observers in treaty meetings 
as non-signatories to the treaty.
x Nuclear Weapon States should work to meet 
their NPT disarmament responsibilities 
and pledges, such as those included in the 
2010 NPT Action Plan, through concrete 
measures. These efforts should reduce the 
role and number of nuclear weapons and 
reiterate their commitment towards a world 
free of nuclear weapons.
x China could use the ban treaty as an 
TUUTWYZSNY^YTUWTRTYJFSTܪWXYZXJUTQNH^
with the other nuclear weapon states by co-
XUTSXTWNSLF\TWPNSLUFUJWTSSTܪWXYZXJ
x China, France and Russia can and should play 
RTWJFHYN[JWTQJXNSINXFWRFRJSY[JWNܪHFYNTS
FSIZSIJWYFPJHTSܪIJSHJGZNQINSLRJFXZWJX
YTMJQUGWNILJYMJHTSܪIJSHJLFUHWJFYJIG^
technical limitations between nuclear and 
non-nuclear weapon states.
NATO and nuclear umbrella states
x NATO needs to decide whether and how it 
wishes to engage with the nuclear ban treaty. 
x It could work to reduce any tensions 
between its members on the ban treaty 
through discussions on collective defence 
approaches that are less reliant on nuclear 
deterrence.
x Non-NATO nuclear umbrella states with a 
deterrence guarantee relationship with the 
United States should consult on how, to 
what extent, and under what circumstances 
they could in practice rely less on extended 
nuclear deterrence. 
